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ABSTRACT
South-Korea is one of the country in the world with the highest rate growth. To develop 
its  economy,  this  country  welcomes  foreign  direct  investments  (FDI) with  free 
economics  zones and  free  trade  agreements.  Further  the  Korean  peninsula  has  a 
strategic location due to its short distance to China and Japan. As the result,  a large 
amount of foreign companies invests there  (about 40% of the annual FDI are new).  
International joint venture  (IJV) is an entry mode largely used for a company to go 
abroad. Moreover, management control  and performance have been considered by the 
scholar as two important factors to consider while doing an international joint venture. 
Thus, the present thesis aims to investigate the relationship between these two factors in 
joint ventures made between a Korean and a French company located in South-Korea. 
The research problem of the study is: “Does management control affect performance in 
French-Korean  JVs located in South-Korea?”.  In the theoretical part of the study, the 
concepts and approaches of  management control and IJV performance are presented. 
The study of these two factors have been controverted due to environment study and the 
difference of approach.
To answer the question, a quantitative research is conducted through a comparative case 
study. The sample of this study is composed of 4 French MNCs undertaking a JV with a 
Korean  company  in South-Korea.  A face to face interview with  a French manager  of 
each case has been done to reply to a questionnaire of 33 questions. 
The empirical part of the study indicated that there is no evidence on the relationship  
between management control and performance. In the 4 case studied, the absence of 
control has been observed. Indeed, the result of success of the venture where the result 
of  a  great  selection of the partner  (similar  company culture)  and a  clear  agreement 
between the partner about the venture management. 
______________________________________________________________________
KEYWORDS: Management control, Performance, French-Korean joint ventures.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Introduction of the study
During the last decades, the international business environment has become increasingly 
more  global,  creating  new  opportunities  as  well  as  challenges,  resulting  in  highly 
dynamic markets. The phenomena of globalization has led companies to go abroad to 
develop their firm in a new markets because of falling of trade barriers and barriers to 
market  entry.  This  development  has  changed  the  competition  to  a  higher  global 
competitiveness  between  companies.  The  introduction  of  new  products  or  the 
penetration of  new markets  has  become a tough challenge even for  a  multinational 
company (MNC). To cope with the situation, the organizational focus is moving from 
economies of scale towards a  specific core activity, while outsourcing other activities 
(Knoben 2008). As a result, firms has tended to form international strategic alliances 
with other companies located outside of the home country to either penetrate the local 
market of the latter, or to exchange skills and knowledge. 
Among the internationalization strategy, International Joint Venture (IJV) has been the 
entry mode the most utilized these last decades with a significant increasing adopted 
these last years by multinational companies (Knoben 2008). In the mean time, scholars 
have given a considerable theoretical and empirical attention of this strategic alliance 
due to its challenges and outcomes. Indeed, IJV are motivated to various reasons, such 
as  risk  reduction,  economies  of  scale,  shared  technology,  co-opting  or  blocking 
competition, overcoming government-mandated investment or trade barriers (Contractor 
& Lorange 1988). However, in practice, many IJVs did not survive and have pushed 
researchers to undertake investigation on the reasons of failure. 
Despite the large amount of researches done about IJV, it is still relevant to undertake 
studies on this field. In fact, it  is possible to find controversial results regarding the 
same area of research but from a different environment. As note Adler (1991), “typical 
work behaviors vary across culture”, which justify the reason of different conclusions 
found in the research on the same subject matter. Moreover, because of the progress of 
new technologies and the environment change, in particular due to the globalization 
process,  IJVs  are  constantly  evolving.  Therefore,  business  studies  have to  keep  on 
following the change in IJV in order to be updated.
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Holmes (2010),  CEO Korn/Ferry Korea,  argues that “Asia will  be at  the cockpit  of 
growth”. Among the leader countries of Asia (China, Japan, South-Korea and India), 
China has been mainly the center of the previous studies with generally US or UK-
based joint venture (JV). However, these last years, South-Korea has taken an important 
position  into  the  worldwide  market.  In  fact,  its  economy  is  growing  continuously 
despite the economic crisis in 2009 and is considered as the fastest one nowadays in the 
world (French-Korean Chamber of Commerce and Industry – FKCCI 2010). Moreover, 
Korea has attracted a great amount of  Foreign  Direct Investment  (FDI) – see Table 1, 
and will keep on drawing attention to foreign company since free trade agreements with 
European Union  (EU)  have been signed  in October 2010 (EUROPA 2010) and more 
recently with the United-States (US) in November 2011 (USTR 2011). This thesis will 
focus on FDIs and more especially on the joint venture mode. 
In 2011, the FTA with the EU may facilitate the economic relationship and attract more 
Korean  companies  in  Europe.  Due  to  this  important  change,  it  will  be  relevant  to 
undertake research about the development of JV in Korea. As I am from France, I have 
chosen to concentrate more specifically on the commercial relationship between France 
and South-Korea.  Nowadays,  South-Korea  has  more  than  200  French  companies 
operating in their territory including about 15 through a JV. On the other hand, France 
welcomes no more than 10 Korean companies. Therefore, in the present thesis, the joint 
ventures between French and Korean companies in the context of South-Korea will be 
the focus of this research. (KCCI 2010)
“Control plays an important role in the capacity of a firm to achieve its goals.”
(Geringer & Hebert 1989)
Management control and performance in IJV have been two factors in which business 
studies  has  given  a  particular  attention  from the  beginning  of  the  establishment  of 
strategic  alliances.  The  concepts  of  control  and  performance  vary  from a  study  to 
another one and from a situation to another. However, they both affect the well being of 
the joint venture as they are present in any cases but defined differently. As a result, this 
research  is  to  investigate  how  control  and  performance  are  defined  and  used  into 
French-Korean joint ventures in South-Korea. 
1.2. Purpose and limitations
As stated previously, a large amount of academic research have been done about IJV 
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around the world but just a few have concentrated in IJV in South-Korea such as Choi 
and Beamish (2004), Korhonen (2005), Kim and Gray (2009),  and Park, Giroud  and 
Glaister (2009). Moreover, the center of interest of those studies is oriented on joint 
ventures either with US firms or with MNCs by the neighbors of the Korean peninsula 
such as Japanese or Chinese firms (China has been the center of most of the research 
done in Asia due to the its importance in the business and economic world according to 
the  previous  studies  read  –  see  “1.3.  Literature  review of  previous  research”).  The 
purpose of this paper is to study exclusively the French-Korean joint ventures hosted in 
South-Korean. South Korea is becoming more powerful into the world with a 13th rank 
in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) whereas it was on the 25th position 6 years 
ago (CIA 2011).  As it  is shown on the table  1,  the amount of FDI has increasingly 
grown up in 2004 and stabilized  afterwards.  It is interesting to notice as well that the 
manufacturing industry with especially the manufacturing of components and materials 
takes an important part of the FDI. The amount of such FDIs proves the interest to 
invest in this industry in South-Korea. In fact, after the 2010 crisis, the amount of FDI 
in  the  manufacturing  industry  is  still  increasing  while  the  amount  of  services 
investments  drops  down. Finally,  over  one  third  of  every  year  FDIs  are  new 
investments. Furthermore,  thanks  to  the  establishment  of free  trade  agreements,  the 
amount of FDI in Korea may increase further in 2011. Thus, a study involving Korea as 
a host country for such investments provided an opportunity to know more about its 
business manner and behavior with foreign companies. It will be also a chance to test 
the  generalizable  or  extend  the previous  findings of  the  IJV  literature  regarding 
management control and performance in South-Korean-based IJVs, as shown next.
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Manufacturing NA NA NA NA NA 3 007 3 725 4875
Services NA NA NA NA NA 8,387 7 594 4 715
Others NA NA NA NA NA 317 165 96
Total 6 471(NA)
12 796
(NA)
11 566
(NA)
11 427
(NA)
10 515
(NA)
11 711
(37,8)
11 484
(35,0)
13 713
(40,4)
NA: Not Available, Figure in ( ) indicates the percentage of new investment.
Table 1. Foreign Direct Investment in South-Korea by industry (Invest Korea 2011)
On the other hand, a countless amount of research has been conducted on management 
control and IJV performance but appears not have the same conclusion (see comments 
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by  Zhang  & Li 2001; Barden, Steensma  & Lyles 2005;  and Lu & Hebert 2005).  The 
purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  investigate  JVs in  the  area  of  management  control  and 
performance.  These two elements are fundamental within a joint venture because of 
their critical variations from a IJV to another one. These variations could be explained 
by the fact that control and performance are defined and measured differently. Thus, this 
research is to answer the following two research questions: 
How do French-Korean JVs manage control and performance?
Does management control affect the performance of such ventures?
Empirically, this research will be conducted in Korea through a comparative analysis of 
4 case  studies  of  a  French  MNC  operating  a  joint  venture  with  a  South  Korean 
company. As a first step, the literature review will examine broadly the assets of control 
and performance in IJV. Then, the comparative case studies will empirically analyze the 
theories and go into depth  of the management control and its effects on performance. 
The case studies chosen will be independent in a sense that they will be in the same 
environment  but  will  not  be related each other.  Finally,  the obtained results  will  be 
compared and a conclusion will be made accordingly. The research design will be more 
developed in the part “4. Research methodology”.
In  order  to conduct  a  reliable  research, some concepts  and limitations  need  to  be 
designated. Next, the concept of IJV will be defined followed by the description of the 
limitations of the area studied. Further limitations will be described in the section “4.3. 
Validity and reliability of the study”.
IJVs are regarded as a strategic alliance between at least two legal entities undertaking a 
single or specific series of transactions where they share mutually the profits and losses 
(Gutterman 2002). They aim to benefit all the parties in a case of a partial acquisition, or 
a  specific  commercial  enterprise  in  the  case  of  a  greenfield  investment  (Gutterman 
2002). Moreover,  IJVs  link  companies  from  at  least  two different  countries  and 
operating either on the parents’ country or on a third host country. In the present study, 
sole IJVs in Korea having two partners have been the target of this study. In fact dyadic 
relationship is the most spread configuration of IJV. As a result, IJV based on a wholly 
owned subsidiaries, mergers and acquisitions or greenfield investment will not be taken 
into account in this research. 
Luo, Shenkar and Nyaw (2001) have shown that results from a same study  but in a 
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different environment tended to be different. The environment can be defined mainly by 
the  country  borders  but  also the  company culture. In  the  case  of  this  research,  the 
environment of the study is South-Korea.
Studying IJV is a broad topic which needs to be narrowed down to provide relevant 
evidences  and  to  bring  an  accurate  answer  to  the  research  questions.  Despite  the 
interrelations of criteria involved in an IJV, this study is limited to examine the main 
factors considering management control and performance within an IJV.
The joint ventures selected for this research gather companies disregarding their number 
of employee and previous experiences on JV or IJV. Then, the perspective of the study 
is not industry specific. Finally, all the ventures selected for the study do not involve the 
Korean or French government as they are running a joint venture with a private partner.
1.3. Literature review of previous research
Extent literature has studied IJVs for almost five decades covering most of the issues in 
several contexts gathering about more than 4500 books and over 500 articles (Larimo 
2010). This literature review of the previous research presents a selection of articles and 
assumes that some studies may have been forgotten. Moreover, the business books used 
on the present thesis are voluntarily not presented except for the one written by Killing 
(1983) as it presents a well-known concept about control and performance. In fact, IJV 
theory  has changed significantly over the past years (Yan & Gray 2001) and journal 
articles present more updated information than books because of their ease and speed of 
being  published.  Furthermore,  the  study  published  in  academic  journal  focus  more 
deeply on a particular subject while a book gathers usually broad information about a 
subject. These are the reasons why journal articles have been privileged in this literature 
review.
The works presented in the literature review aim to introduce the different perspectives, 
concepts  and approaches  made across  the years  about  IJV management  control  and 
performance. However, the findings observed in those works will not be presented due 
to  the  notice  of  numerous  alterations. Therefore,  their  conclusions  have  not  been 
included in the literature review and in the research because they may lead the research 
inadequately.  Finally, these articles have been selected for most of them  according to 
their  amount of redundancy in the references of articles found through my personal 
 18
research.
This literature review is divided into two parts  conforming to the topic of thesis. The 
first  part  focuses on  “Management  control”  theories,  and  the  second  part on  “IJV 
performance”  theories. The  previous research are presented chronologically from the 
oldest to the newest. A summary table will present at the end of the previous research to 
recapitulate the introduced works.
MANAGEMENT CONTROL
Killing (1983) wrote a book called “Strategy for joint venture success”. This book is 
considered  as  the  first  in-depth  study of  control  and the  way to  achieve  successful 
performance  into  a  joint  venture.  It focuses in  particular  on control  design and 
performance  within 37  Mexican-based JVs from developed countries (North America 
notably).  Killing  develops  three  kinds  of  control:  formal  agreements,  staffing  and 
influence techniques. However,  while his theory has been largely spread,  it has been 
controverted and criticized  significantly  during the last 30 years,  but also developed 
such as in the study done by Geringer  and Hebert  (1989).  The theory from Killing 
(1983) will be used more in the approach of management control paradigms than in the 
theoretical perspective of IJV performance in spite of the title of the book “joint venture 
success”.
Geringer  and  Hebert  (1989) have  been  one  of  the  first  to  publish  conceptual 
frameworks about control  and performance in IJVs. Based on the previous literature, 
they  established  a  conceptualization  of  control  gathering  three  dimensions:  control 
focus,  control  extent  and  control mechanism.  They  also  studied the  link  between 
strategy and control  and its direct influence on performance.  As a result, they built a 
model in order to clarify the nature of linkages between these three parameters: control, 
strategy and performance in IJVs. Later on, scholars have utilized their framework to 
develop new theory generations. In this study, the framework developed will be mainly 
used.
Mjoen and Tallman (1997) have conducted a study on control and performance in 102 
IJVs  of  Norwegian  companies  located  around the  world.  Based  on this  study, they 
developed a model which provides an integrated approach of the relationships between 
strategic  resources,  equity,  control,  and  performance.  It  takes  into  account 
simultaneously  the resource-based  strategy,  transaction  cost  theory,  and  bargaining 
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power models. This quite complex but complete model has been the sources of many 
other researches and will be a part of this study as well.
Newburry and Zeira (1999) examined the effects of autonomy on the effectiveness of 
equity international joint ventures (EIJVs) through 34 EIJVs located in Hungary and 49 
in England. More to the point, they developed a multidimensional concept of autonomy 
linked with the performance of the  venture. In fact, they assume that autonomy is a 
synonym of  success  in  IJV as  it  shows the well  being of the delegation process  of 
control. However, in their study, cultural factors have been as well measured and shown 
that this observation would vary from a company/country’s culture to another one. 
Luo,  Shenkar  and  Nyaw  (2001)  compared  the  control-performance  relationship 
between the foreign versus local parents in IJVs in China. Based on the study of 295 
Chinese-based  IJVs,  they  observed  the  perspective  between  the  local  and  foreign 
parents on control  and satisfaction of the  alliance through four main factors  (equity 
share, goal incongruity, parent competencies, and cultural distance). In fact, the Chinese 
government  is  strongly  involved  on  the  decision  of  the  JV to  protect  and  control 
Chinese  businesses  and activities.  As a  result,  it  creates  a  dual  local  parent  for  the 
venture.  They  also  emphasized  the influence  and  effects  of  dual  control  on IJV 
performance. This  work will be used both in the development of management control 
and IJV performance theories. As China is a neighbor of South-Korean, it will relevant 
to compare the results.
Yan and Gray (2001)  developed a grounded-theory model  based  on their  previous 
works  in  1994 about  the  antecedents  and effects  of  the  parent  management  control 
structure  in  IJV.  Through  the  studies  of  data  collected  from  90  US-Chinese 
manufacturing  joint  ventures,  they observed  the relationship  between the  ownership 
control and the strategic, structural and operational control. Moreover, compare to the 
previous  studies,  this  research  emphasized  on  the  local  partner’s  role,  interest,  and 
objectives  in  the  IJV  and  its  interaction  with  the  MNC.  In  their  work,  relative 
distribution of bargaining power between the partners determines their relative levels of 
control over the IJV.
Zhang and Li (2001) investigated the dynamic relationship between the control design 
and performance within IJVs. They analyzed across 8 Japanese-Chinese joint ventures 
based in China the evolution of control design over the time and its effect on the success 
of  the  venture. Through  a  cross-sectional  study,  they  determined which  type  of 
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management control gives the most successful performance. 
Choi and Beamish (2004) built a framework about management  control partitioning 
between MNC and local emerging market partners.  Based on the study of 71 Korean-
Japanese, Korean-US, Korean-EU and Korean-Canadian JVs located in South-Korea, 
they studied the relation between the control partitioning of the venture and the effects 
of the latter  on the success of the venture. The classified control partitioning into four 
different ways: split control management, shared management, foreign parent dominant 
management, and local parent dominant management. As this research has been focused 
on South-Korean IJVs, the results of this studies will be compared with the one found in 
Choi and Beamish’s work.
Lu  and  Hebert  (2005) proposed  a  transaction-cost-based  contingency  framework 
resulting from a research regarding the relationship between equity control  and IJV 
performance. Based on the observations of  720 Japanese IJVs in  12 developing Asian 
countries (China, Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, 
Brunei, Vietnam, Laos and Bangladesh ),  this research argues that IJV performance is 
mainly a function of the fit between a parent firm’s strategy and its control structures, 
rather than solely the direct outcome of the extent of control exercised. According to 
their empirical results, their approach is not applicable in every situation, in particular in 
R&D joint ventures, but shows an interesting fact as it will be more discussed in the 
literature review part.
Luo (2007) studied  the effect  of  specific  parts  of  control  on performance.  Luo  has 
divided joint venture control into two distinct types of control which coexist in every 
IJV: private control and collective control. Through this division, he demonstrates that 
control sometimes helps,  but sometimes hinders IJV success. The demonstration has 
been assessed with  a survey and  through archival data referencing to 190 samples in 
China.  Despite  of  the  limitation  of  the  study of  the  geographic  area  of  China,  the 
findings  are  relevant  and  may  be  the  last  and  most  updated  one  regarding  the 
management control theory. 
Nguyen  and Larimo (2009)  focused on the manner of establishing control structure 
within  an  IJV  through  Killing’s  (1983)  theory.  Based on  54  Finnish  IJVs,  they 
developed a theory regarding the relationship between the parent’s firm strategy, its link 
with management control and their effect on the venture’s performance. Although their 
work  concentrates  mainly  on  IJV  strategy,  it  brings  relevant  facts  regarding  the 
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environment and the reasons of the establishment of control in an IJV. 
Fan (2011) examined control through an analytical inductive case study. The author 
paid attention to the effects of inside and outside control from both  side of the  joint 
venture’s  parents and their  respective  management  team.  This  study  brings  new 
information concerning the effects of outside control, but needs to be further developed. 
In fact,  his  work is  based only on theory and has not  been tested yet,  however the 
approach of control will be used in this thesis.
IJV PERFORMANCE
Geringer  and Hebert  (1991)  discussed  the  different data  collection  approaches  of 
measuring performance of IJV through two distinct but related studies taking place in 
the US and in Canada. In particular, this study aims to examine the reliability and the 
correlation between various IJV performance measures and assessments. Geringer and 
Hebert show some evidences about the methodology of  assessing performance and its 
impact  on the results.  Moreover,  they  emphasize  the need to  adapt  the  selection of 
criteria  to  study  according  to  the  environment  of  the  area  studied and  also  the 
companies.
Demirbag  and  Mirza  (2000)  explored  empirically  some factors  affecting  IJV 
performance and built a framework made out of their findings of the study of47 IJVs in 
Turkey. They focused especially on the association between the inter-partner relations 
such as conflict, commitment, control, co-operation, autonomy and performance. The 
outcomes of their studies confirm that there is a strong relationship between control and 
inter-partner relations and IJV performance. 
Boateng and Glaister (2002) examined several aspects affecting IJV performance in 57 
IJVs in West Africa. In particular, their study focuses on the partner capabilities, capital 
adequacy, congruity of motives and goals. On top of that, they analyzed the difference 
between an IJV made with a private company and one made with the government. They 
found out that IJV performs better with a private partner than with the government. Due 
to  its  specific  environment,  this  study brings a  different  point  of view of analyzing 
control and performance. It will be used both parts of the literature review (management 
control and IJV performance).
Robson, Leonidou and Katsikeas (2002) present a methodical, analytical and focused 
review  of  factors  affecting  IJV performance. In  order  to  identify  all  the variables 
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affecting  IJV  performance,  they scanned the  previous  literature  and gathered  74 
determinants and 7 performance measurement approaches to assess IJV performance. 
From these results,  they  built  a  table classifying the  variable into  14 categories.  A 
framework  has  been  also  built  to  visualize  the  process  of  IJV performance. Their 
methods of assessing performance will be in particular utilized in the empirical part of 
this study.
Ren, Gray and Kim (2009) present an in-depth review and critics of previous studies 
about  IJV over the past 10 years. From their research, they established a conceptual 
model for studying IJV performance differentiating the performance measures and the 
performance drivers. In this paper, only the part covering the linkage between control 
and performance will be used. As the work done by Robson et al. (2002), this in-depth 
review will be mainly used in the empirical part of this study.
Larimo (2010) analyzed the performance and the factors affecting it in IJV located in 
Central  and Eastern European (CEE) countries.  Based on the activity  of  77 Finnish 
firms having a JV in a CEE country,  he analyzed the possible variations in the results 
depending on the measure of performance. The study shows that most of venture failed 
or could not reach their objectives. Moreover, the investigations present a divergence in 
the results which challenges the previous research and restrains any conclusion. 
To conclude the introduction of  the  previous  literature,  the table  2 recapitulates  the 
works reviewed. 
Authors
IJV origins
(Sample Size)
IJV 
Location Concepts developed Area of Focus
Killing (1983)
Mostly USA
(37)
Mexico
Staffing, Influence techniques, Formal 
agreements
Control design and IJV performance
Geringer and Hebert 
(1989)
Based on previous
 literature
Control focus, extent and mechanism
Management control, strategy and 
performance within IJVs
Mjoen and Tallman 
(1997) 
Norwegian 
(102)
Worldwide
Interrelation between strategic resources, 
equity, control, and performance
Control and performance in IJVs
Newburry and Zeira 
(1999)
–
(34) & (49)
Hungary & 
England
Autonomy as a multidimensional concept 
and effectiveness
Control and performance in IJVs
Luo, Shenkar and 
Nyaw (2001)
–
(295)
China
Relationship between dual parent control 
and IJV performance
Specific control and IJV performance
Yan and Gray (2001)
USA
(90)
China
Influence of bargaining power, ownership 
on control
Antecedents of control 
Zhang and Li (2001)
Japan
(8 cases)
China
Evolution of control design and its effect 
on the success of the venture.
Control design and IJV performance
Choi and Beamish 
(2004)
US, Canada, 
Japan, EU (71)
South-
Korea
Control partitioning: split, share, 
dominant control 
Management control and IJV performance
Lu and Hebert (2005)
Japanese
(720)
12 Asian 
countries
Fit between strategy and performance 
through control
Ownership control and IJV performance
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Luo (2007)
–
(190) China Private control and collective control Specific management control
Nguyen and Larimo 
(2009)
Finland
(54) –
Control  structure  fits  the  strategy  to  achieve 
performance
Strategy,  control  and  IJV 
performance
Fan (2011)
Analytical inductive
 case study 
IJV control: parent inside and parent outside Management control
Geringer and Hebert 
(1991)
Canada, US
(2) – 
The correlation between IJV performance and 
assessment
IJV performance
Demirbag and Mirza 
(2000)
Worldwide
(47) Turkey Inter partner relationship IJV performance
Boateng and Glaister 
(2002)
Western Europe, 
US and Asia 
(57)
West-
Africa
Partner capabilities, capital adequacy, congruity 
of motive and goal as factors influencing IJV
IJV performance, culture and 
control
Robson, Leonidou and 
Katsikeas (2002)
Based on previous
 literature
Extensive review of factors affecting IJV 
performance
IJV performance
Ren, Gray and Kim 
(2009)
Overview of the last 10 
years academic studies
Review of factors affecting IJV performance 
studied over the past 10 years
IJV performance
Larimo (2010)
Finnish
(77)
CEE 
countries
Analysis of IJV performance and factors 
affecting IJV performance
IJV performance
Table 2. Summary of the previous literature 
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1.4. Structure of the thesis
The  structure  of  the  thesis  follows  the  general  presentation  of  a  business  paper: 
Introduction, Literature review (2 parts), Research methodology, Empirical results and 
Conclusion as it will be detailed below and oversimplify with the figure 1.
Chapter one is an introduction of the research area and the research questions including 
a presentation of the past research. First, the background of the study was described. 
Then  the  reasons of  the  study were developed  followed by the  presentation  of  the 
research questions and the delimitations of the study. Finally, this first chapter ended 
with a review of the previous literature that this research will use.
Chapter two develops in depth the theoretical perspectives of control in IJV. Based on 
the previous literatures, the different approaches,  concept and theories of control are 
presented and analyzed. Then, the information gathered about management control will 
be used in the empirical study of the French-Korean JVs.
Chapter three, in the same  purpose of the previous chapter,  highlights the relevant 
theories in relation with IJV performance. Based as well on the previous studies, it will 
present  the  different  approaches  and  theories  about  achieving  and  measuring 
performance.  A list of factor having influence on IJV performance will be made and 
tested  in  the  empirical  study  of the  French-Korean  JVs.  To  conclude  the  literature 
review, a framework will summarize the theories studied at the end of the chapter.
Chapter four  presents  the appropriate  methodology for  the accomplishment  of  this 
research.  The  chapter  begins  with  the  presentation  of  the  different  research 
methodologies followed by the justifications of the  method  chosen including the data 
collection and  data analysis. In order to achieve an accurate results of the study, the 
reliability and validity of the study will be presented. Furthermore, the selection of the 
qualitative multiple-case study is justified and the case companies presented. 
Chapter five gives the empirical results of the studies.  The results are presented and 
analyzed individually according to each case studied. Then, a cross-comparative table 
summaries the data collected during the interviews. 
Chapter six concludes the research. It contains a summary of the research followed by 
the  final  conclusions  of  the  study.  In  addition,  it  describes  briefly  the  managerial 
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implications which derive from this research and suggests directions regarding further 
research.
1. INTRODUCTION
- Introduction to the topic
- Limitations of the study
- Literature review of the previous research
- Presentation of the structure of the thesis 
LITERATURE REVIEW
2. MANAGEMENT CONTROL
 IN IJV
3. IJV PERFORMANCE
- Definition of management control
- Presentation of the different concepts 
and theories about management control 
in IJV
- Definition of IJV performance
- Presentation of the method to measure IJV 
performance
- Presentation of the factors affecting IJV
RESEARCH & RESULTS
4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
- Research design
- Presentation of the empirical context of 
the study (Case companies and South-
Korea)
- Result of the empirical study
- Analysis of the results through a 
comparative case studies approach
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
- Summary of the study
- Conclusion
- Introduction to further research
Figure 1. Structure of the thesis
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2. MANAGEMENT CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURE
The chapter 2 is the first part of the literature review of this research. In this section, 
based on the introduction of the previous studies in the chapter “1.3. literature review of 
previous  research”,  the  approaches,  conceptions  and theories  regarding management 
control within an IJV will be presented. These studies will be further developed in this 
chapter.  The  purpose  of  this  literature  review  is  to  extend  complete  knowledge 
regarding the  topic  in  order  to  draw a  theoretical  framework.  Then,  relying  on this 
approach, a questionnaire (appendix 1) will be made to investigate management control 
and performance and its possible relationship within French-Korean joint ventures  in 
Korea.  The  final  conceptual  framework  is  presented  at  the  end  of  the  chapter  “3. 
International joint venture performance”.
2.1. Definition of management control in IJV
During the  past  three  decades,  the amount  of  studies  about  IJV has been increased 
suggesting each time a different perspective and interpretation of the divers terms used 
in jargon of the field of the IJV. The importance of the definition of such terms has an 
impact  on  the  methodology  and  result  of  the  research  (Geringer  & Hebert  1991). 
Consequently, in this part, the definitions of control from the different sources of the 
previous  literature  will  be  discussed  and  analyzed.  Those  definitions  may vary 
according to the situation and environment of the IJV. Then, the relevant aspects  of 
control will be suggested in order to give the direction of the thesis.
In 1983, Killing and Schaan while working together argues that control regards only the 
parents of the joint venture. In fact, they suggest that control is a matter of decision 
power.  Through this control, the parent company ensures to affect the joint venture in 
order  to  perform  into  the  way  they  wish  and  achieve  their  personal  objectives. 
Nonetheless,  it  is  important  to  highlight  that  their  works  tend  to  give a  certain 
advantages to the North American JV because of their domination on the joint venture 
activities (about 43% of the all joint ventures were American in 1971 and 80% if the 
UK-based JV are added – Killing 1983). This idea of winner-looser under the pretext of 
parenting the JV has been repeated later in 1997 by Ding, however there are other ways 
of looking at control in IJV. For example, Geringer and Hebert (1989) went further on 
the idea of Killing (1983), Schaan (1983) and Ding (1997). In fact, they demonstrated 
 28
that  control  in  IJV is  complex  and  multidimensional.  Three  dimensions  have  been 
distinguished into IJV control:  (1) the focus of control which refers to the scope of 
activities over which parents exercise control; (2) the degree of control achieved by the 
parents; and (3) the mechanisms the parents use to exercise control (The Geringer and 
Hebert’s (1989) concept will be more developed later in the “2.4. The multidimensional 
approach of control”). It should not be concluded from their perspectives that control is 
the  sole  matter  of  the  parents of  the  venture in  particular  when it  is  linked to  IJV 
performance, but there is no doubt of the importance of their role.
It is often argued that traditionally control in IJVs has been limited to the degree of 
ownership (Mjoen & Tallman 1997). Also, Geringer and Hebert (1989) said that many 
studies have concentrated on only one dimension or element of control:  ownership. It 
would be exaggerated to claim that control  may be determined only by the level of 
ownership. In fact, ownership may not be the most accurate representation of control in 
each situation and may even have a low influence in governance (Mjoen  & Tallman 
1997).  It  is  well  known that  several  criteria  are  interrelated  while  describing  some 
important  factor  in  IJV  and  this  is  what  Mjoen  and  Tallman  (1997)  have  been 
substantiated. They have taken into consideration several elements and proposed to have 
an influence on the performance of IJVs. From this point of view, control cannot be 
studied without considering the factors surrounding. 
One of the most popular motives of the creation of IJVs is the exchange of technology 
and knowledge. In this case, control leans towards to play a role of protection (Killing 
1983). In order to avoid the JV partner to copy the capabilities of the IJV’s parent, 
control regulates and checks through authority the access of data. These rules of conduct 
can also be established while an MNC starts a strategic alliances with another company 
located in a less developed country. Above all, Hamel (1991) extends the assumption of 
control as a regulation to cover the competitive advantage of the parent company. He 
also argues that control protects “the performance possibilities of both joint venture and 
parent”.  These  lines  of  arguments  lead  to  investigate  whether  control  is  used  as  a 
protection of knowledge transfer within a R&D IJV in Korea. It can also be interpreted 
that the role of control adapts itself to the circumstances of the IJVs.
 
At first sights, the basic function of control into a joint venture is to ensure the company 
to  achieve  their  goals.  Glaister  and Buckley  (1998)  have  declared  that control  is a 
process to lead the organizational objectives  to sucess. In practice, control is a leader 
which has to influence the human resources and not to oppress them. Lu and Hebert 
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(2005) support as well this argument and go more to the point. They characterize control 
as an “ability to exercise authority and influence over the JV’s strategic and operational 
decision,  system and  methods”.  Therefore  control  can  be  taken  to  be  an  intangible 
resource  which,  according  to  Mjoen  and  Tallman  (1997),  can  strongly  affect  the 
outcomes  of  the  IJV.  Moreover,  in  contrast  to  what  have  been  argued  in  the  last 
paragraph, Lu and Hebert (2005) consider equity share as the central element in parent 
control.  This does not  mean that it  is  true,  but it  makes sense as it  may define the 
amount of manager in the management team of the IJV.  At last,  Child, Faulkner and 
Tallman (2005) have written that “control is a central aspect of the management”. The 
view suggested here emphasizes a social control and managerial control of the strategic 
alliance. Thus, the staff of the JV and its relationship with JV’s partner are perceived as 
the key success factors of the IJVs.
Through control, it is possible to observe the behavior of the joint venture and so to 
adjust the strategy to match the objective if the results recorded  go wrong. In effects, 
“control is to aim predictability and critical information” (Makhija & Ganesh 1997). For 
instance,  using indicators  that  the company would have beforehand set  up on some 
critical factors, managers accountable are able to constitute their action and decisions 
according to them (Child et al. 2005). The consequences of control in this case related 
to the interest of forecasting by keeping a track on the activities of the joint venture.
Finally,  managing  an  IJV either  its  strategy  or its  control  is  unique  despite  of  the 
similarities observed from an IJV to another one. In fact, it has been proved that culture 
and environment of the company of country interact to create a unique set of managerial 
values and control (Ralston, Gustafson, Mainiero & Umstot 1993). These two factors – 
culture  and  environment,  change  the  order  of  the  IJV’s  mise-en-scène  due  to  its 
important impact on the inter-relation with people and the behavior of the MNC (Mjoen 
& Tallman 1997). Further a large amount of studies have been controverted by the fact 
the IJV is taking place on a certain part of the world. In contrast, some countries, for 
instance China,  have received more attention than others  due to  its  specific  way of 
managing business. One way of summarizing this would be to say that management 
control is specific to the company and its target country.
To summarize, the divergence of opinions and assessments of control demonstrate an 
ambiguity on its role which highly depends on the condition of the JV. Nevertheless, 
over the time, it would not be an exaggeration to say that the role of control has moved 
from an authoritative and dominating influence towards a requirement to adjust  and 
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regulate the joint venture in order to achieve high performance on the IJVs and not 
anymore  on  the  parents’.  From  these lines  of  arguments,  a  clear  definition  of 
management control cannot be written as its meaning varies from a situation to another. 
However, several aspects linked to control can be enumerated and will be taken into 
account  on  the  assessment  of  the  French-Korean joint  ventures.  Theses  aspects  are 
summarized in the table below.
General aspect of control and its management
- The importance of the role of the parents of the IJV
- the interrelations of factors affecting control and the outcomes of the JV
- The bargaining power and the influence of control on the JV (how it is perceived?)
- Protect patterns and competitive advantages
- Depends of the managers of both parents
- Forecast performance and adjust IJV strategy
- Management control is specific to each IJV
Table 3. Summary of the different aspects of control
On top of being ambiguous, control interacts as well with several factors. According to 
the importance of those factors, management control may be moderately affected as it 
will be explained in the next chapter.
2.2. The interrelations of IJV factors linked to control
Although management control has been defined, the external and internal context of the 
area of the research has to be considered. The factors composing these contexts have to 
be identified, measured and weighted in order to make a reliable research. Here Mjoen 
and Tallman (1997) proposed a deep approach of the interaction of the IJV factors and 
their link to management control (figure 3). They have drawn a complete theoretical 
model highlighting the different interrelations linked to control in an IJV. However, the 
concept  of control  has been approached through a different  way. In fact,  they have 
defined control through several forces affecting each other. For instance, control and 
specific  control  are  separated  and  are  under  the  influence  of  different  elements. 
Previously, strategy and control were connected  while in this model, strategy affects 
specific control but not control. Mjoen and Tallman (1997) define “Specific control” as 
the control over specific JV activities while “Control” focuses on the overall control of 
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the  venture.  Moreover  this  model  can  be  interpreted  as  a  process  to  achieve 
performance. Each factor has to be validated from left to right according to the direction 
of the arrows to obtain great outcomes on the joint venture.
Figure 2. Theoretical model of the relationships between control and performance 
(Mjoen & Tallman 1997: 264)
In the figure above, the dark arrows represent a strong relation between the elements 
and normal arrows show that there is a link between those elements. The sense of the 
arrows  shows  the  direction  of  the  effect  from an element  A  to  another element  B. 
According to the figure, “Control” and “Culture” are the key factors for JV success. 
Nevertheless,  in  this  study, the factor  “Culture” will  be moved further  apart  as  this 
research focuses exclusively on management control and performance. It is important to 
note that culture, in this case, is not considered as a factors affecting control. Finally, the 
external control such as the context of the IJV has been omitted as well as the effect of 
feedback from the JV performances.
Among the factors presented in the graph, “Law” which represents all of the regulations 
regarding to IJV, and “Strategic resources” which is not fully connected to the research 
will be discussed in the sub-chapter “2.4. The multidimensional approach of control”. In 
addition, “Equity” and “Relative contribution” which are related to each other, will be 
discussed  in  the  sub-chapter  “2.6.  Equity  share  and  control  allocation”.  It  will  be 
followed by the discussion of the impact of “bargaining power” over control in the sub-
chapter “2.7.  Bargaining power and control”. “Specific control”  and “Control” will be 
discussed in the sub-chapter “2.9. Inside, outside, private and collective factors”. Finally 
Control
Performance
Previous
experiences
Relative
contribution
Laws
Culture
Bargaining
power
Equity
Strategic
ressources
Specific 
control
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the factor “previous experience” will be argued below.
Killing (1983: 28) argues that a lack of experience from a parent firm is likely to be an 
“exercise of raw power” through control within an IJV, hence having some experiences 
moderates the beginner’s mistakes. International or local joint venture experience is an 
ability that takes time to acquire (Lu & Hebert 2005) and  will help  obviously future 
joint ventures to perform better. Nevertheless, having previous experiences is not only 
the  factor  to  consider  on  the  elaboration  of  the  equity  of  the  venture,  in  particular 
regarding the  elements  to  figure  from the  JV  partner and the  right  achievement  of 
performance. Thus, partner selection appears to be an important factor in the process of 
success of a joint venture but will not be more developed in the present thesis, but taken 
into  account  in  the analysis  of  the empirical  results.  Further  Lu  and Hubert  (2005) 
highlighted that, studies on IJV control can be separated into two categories.  The first 
category of studies focuses on the relationship between the initial conditions of IJV and 
the level  of  equity  control,  while the  other  one  focuses  on  the  equity  control  and 
performance. This study belongs to the second category.
2.3. Killing's approach of joint venture control
As  mentioned in  the  definition  above,  control  has  the  power  to  influence  people 
working within the JV. In other words,  control  can be utilized to  affect the way of 
behaving into the JV. Furthermore,  depending on this  situation,  control  is  exercised 
either by the foreign parent(s) of the JV either together with its local partner. Killing 
(1983) has identified three mechanisms to influence the management of a joint venture 
from the foreign parent: formal agreements, staffing and influence techniques. However, 
Schaan (1983) labeled this behavior as a “negative control” because it aims only to give 
advantages to the foreign parent and do not encourage the venture to last. Therefore, in 
Killing’s  (1983)  theory of control regards  the  interests only on one side of the joint 
venture but brings relevant information on control mechanism.
Formal agreements: are the legal documents which accompany the creation of an IJV 
and are closely connected to the issue of control. Through them, the parent companies 
organize the level of control to the foreign partner. Further, more the parent company is 
involved, the greater its influence.
Staffing: consists to designate the amount of manager from both parts into the IJV.  In 
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fact,  if  the  parent  company  affects  a  large  amount  of people  into  the  IJV,  the 
communication between the venture and the parent company is likely to be improved. In 
1983, Killing argued that this practice do not show evidences regarding the joint venture 
success, but contribute to the dominance of the JV by the parents. Later, this intangible 
resource will be shown as an important factor to success (Mjoen & Tallman 1997).
Influence techniques:  are a qualitative control such as quality process, technical form 
and measure. By asking some information through a pure technical and formal way, the 
parent company access to data and oblige the partner company to act according to them.
Despite the  negative aspects highlighted by Schaan (1983), Killing’s  (1983) approach 
has contributed to the IJV management control theory as it was one of the pioneer of the 
IJV theory. Later on its perspective has been re-used and developed as it will be shown 
next. 
2.4. The multidimensional approach of control
The multidimensional approach has been established by Geringer  and Hebert (1989) 
and has been reused later by a large number of academic writers such as Wang, Wee and 
Koh (1998), Nguyen  and Larimo (2009), and Fan (2011). The developed concept has 
identified three dimensions  into control: the focus of control; the extent or degree of 
control achieved by the parents; and the mechanisms the parents use to exercise control. 
These three elements examine a different part of control. They complement each other 
and are interdependent. In addition, Geringer and Hebert’s (1989) concept is linked with 
the IJV’s strategy and performance. (Geringer & Hebert 1989)
Control  focus: consists  the  JV  to  determine  whether  it  applies  an overall  control  – 
control over the whole IJV’s activity,  or a specific control  –  control over a specific 
activity such as Marketing, sales, and distribution; General management and operation; 
Finance and accounting; R&D; Production and quality; and Human resources (Glaister, 
Husan & Buckley 2005). Furthermore, depending on the parent’s firm abilities and the 
goal of the IJV; control may be established on technology-oriented or market oriented 
activities (Child et al. 2005). (Nguyen and Larimo 2009)
Control extent: is related to the degree of control that the parent company exercises on 
the venture.  Alternatively,  control  extent  agrees on the balance between operating a 
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strict control or a complaisant control. There are pros and cons for both of the extremes 
of control extent. On a complaisant control, the IJV has an abundance of freedom and 
can run the venture autonomously, while it implies none protection for the parent firms’ 
assets.  It  is  undeniably  a  synonym of  trust  between  the  parent  and  the  partner.  In 
contrast, a strict control offers a high level of protection which favors a frequent and 
precise reporting. This type of control has its interests when the parent firm requires a 
high quality product or a need to follow strict procedures and policies. Nonetheless, if 
control is exercised in a too frequent and domineering manner, it is likely to lead the IJV 
to a significant ill or even to its eventual breakdown. (Child et al. 2005)
 
Control mechanism: are the structural arrangements used for directing the IJV such as 
the  “formal  agreements”  from  Killing  (1983)  described  previously.  Friedman  and 
Beguine (1971)  have  extended  the  control  mechanism  to  two  sub-controls:  formal 
control and social control. Formal control regards all the regulation and laws or other 
agreements that explicitly affect the behavior of the IJV. Furthermore formal control has 
not objection due to its formality. On the other hand, social control aims to encourage 
the  informal  relationship  to  allocate  the  common  attitudes  and  knowledge  of  the 
organization. The control mechanism adopted to apply social control refers to informal 
communication, information exchange and training, personal relation, mentoring, and 
development of a common organizational culture. However, it is important to note that 
social control has to be coupled with another control method in order to have feedbacks 
on the intangible resource created by the latter (Mjoen & Tallman 1997). (Friedman & 
Beguine 1971)
 
From their theory, Geringer and Hebert (1989) have developed a framework (figure 2). 
It integrates their approach (control focus, extend and mechanism) and its contexts: the 
firm’s overall strategy. In the figure 2, the strategy, control structure and performance of 
the IJV are illustrated with their different relationship.
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Figure 3. The strategy-control framework of JV performance (Geringer & Hebert 1989)
The framework puts forward the strong relationship between strategy, control and IJV 
performance. It also shows the importance of feedbacks and the interdependence of the 
control  focus,  extent  and  mechanism.  Nguyen  and Larimo  (2009)  employed  this 
framework and tested it within 54 Finnish-based IJVs. The outcomes justify the theory 
that companies using their strategy to build their control structure were more satisfied 
with their  performance than those who did not.  Thus,  it  is  undeniable that strategy, 
performance  and control  are  related  and depend  to  each  other  through  a  triangular 
relationship. Control is made according to the strategy which is judged by the resulted 
performance. The performance gives then feedbacks to the management control and the 
strategy of the venture which are improved accordingly. Seen in this light, performance 
is not just the result of what it has been controlled but also the global outcomes and 
other unverified elements. 
Later  on,  based  on the notion that  parent  control  is  multidimensional  developed by 
Geringer and Hebert (1989), Yan and Gray (1994) have proposed that parent control can 
be exercised in three ways. The first way is that IJV’s board of directors manages the 
control of the venture so called “strategic control” (similar to control extend). Secondly, 
the venture’s top management manages the control of the venture hence “operational 
control” (similar to control focus). Finally, the parents impose procedures and routines 
on the IJV which is named “structural control” (=control mechanism). This is a slightly 
different  approach of  control  than Geringer  and Hebert’s  (1989),  but  with a  similar 
concept and different and more explicit designations. This concept can be found in the 
part “2.7. Bargaining power and control” in the figure 7.
International 
Strategy
Subsidiary/JV
Strategy
Focus   
Control
Extent                    Mechanisms
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2.5. Control structure, autonomy and independence
From the beginning and over the time of the life of strategic alliances, IJVs are facing 
challenges.  In  order  to  achieve  the  goals  of  the  venture,  the  IJV  has  to  adapt  its 
strategies to affront these challenges and put straight again the venture on the way of 
success.  From the fact  that  management  control  is  determined according to  the  IJV 
strategy (Nguyen  &  Larimo 2009), changes within the strategy  may  involve  as well 
changes in the control structure. These  changes can be either  due to the results of the 
IJV performance, either due to an external factor such as change in the government. In 
the  case  the  outcomes of  the  IJV  is  the  origin of  changes,  it  is  suggested  that  IJV 
performances  affect  management  control.  What  needs  to  be  noted  is  the  fact  that 
strategy which is obviously linked to the matter of attaining the objectives of the IJV, is 
also  linked  to  the  control  structure.  Therefore,  there  is  a  relationship  between  the 
performance of the venture and management control.
Furthermore, the structure design of IJVs tends to change according to the outcomes of 
the venture.  Zhang and Li (2001) emphasized that performance is the feedback of the 
JV’s  control.  For  that  reason,  performance  is  a  “motivating  force  to  stimulate  the 
evolution of the control design” Zhang and Li (2001: 1). Accordingly, the outcomes of 
the JV give a dynamic dimension to management control. Based on this assumption, 
Zhang and Li (2001) have imagined a life cycle of management control as it is shown 
on the figure 4.
Figure 4. Evolution of control according to Zhang and Li (2001)
In this figure, it  is theorized that  during the life cycle of an IJV,  the equity share is 
changing according to  the feedbacks from the performance achieved. First  of all,  it is 
supposed  that a  joint  venture  divides  management  control  on  a  basis of shared 
management ownership. Then, following the feedbacks – positive or negative – created 
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by the performance of the venture, management control is likely to move to a dominant 
parent control  during the development stage. Finally,  a joint venture tends to reach an 
independent  management  control  if  the  feedbacks  are  positive  and  then  enter  in a 
mature  stage. In  the  case  the  feedbacks  are  negative,  the  equity  share  may change 
differently and the venture may broke down. 
Nevertheless,  it has been proved  that  shared management  tends  to be inefficient  on 
performance (Killing 1983). Further the purpose of Zhang and Li’s (2001) theory is to 
demonstrate that independence control is decisive for a successful joint venture. Thus, 
they show that shared management and dominant parent control are the steps to achieve 
the independence of the JV control.  More to  the point,  based on other studies, they 
assumed that if the level of control is low, the performance prone to be higher (Zhang & 
Li  2001).  However,  to  achieve  this  high  level  of  performance the  threshold  of 
independency has to be crossed (Zhang & Li 2001). This can be interpreted as poorer is 
performance, higher is the probability that IJV is running independently. Indeed, a high 
performance would not resettle the management control  as it  performs well.  Or,  the 
management control does not simply need to be adjusted as the venture is satisfied with 
its outcomes. As a conclusion, performance gives a rhythm to the control design of the 
venture. 
There are other ways to  look at the  evolution of the IJV  control design. It has been 
argued that control design is linked with performance hence it can be also said that the 
way of managing such alliances affects its outcomes. Newburry and Zeira (1999) argue 
that  the  level  of  freedom into  an  IJV given from the  parent  to  their  venture has  a 
positive effect on the performance. For an IJV, being independent is synonym that it is 
able to work by itself and that the tasks have been well delegated from the parent firms. 
In contrast,  it  means as well  that a high level of control from the parent companies 
signify a failure to assign the mission. Being independent connotes with the trust that 
the parent firm has for the JV and also the ability of running the activities without the 
assistance of the parents. In this sense, it is added that a lack of freedom of the IJV 
strengthens the idea of the abuse of bargaining power of the parent firm on the local 
partner. Thus, the parent company shows a need to control and perhaps a need to protect 
its  own activities. In the works done by Newburry and Zeira (1999), they suggest the 
notion  of  “joint  control”  in  order  to  give  the  control  impartial  and  reinforce  the 
relationship within the joint venture. The joint control takes place into the joint venture 
itself and depends only on the company managing the venture. Further the local partner 
becomes the parent company of the IJV. (Newburry & Zeira 1999)
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It should not be concluded that managing control autonomously is the only method to 
reach high performance in IJVs.  The environment of the alliance is,  in fact, the sole 
determinant of its management control. Other alternatives exist and will be described in 
the following sub-chapter.
2.6. Equity share and control allocation
The division of ownership has been considered for a long time as the base of managing 
control into an IJV and a long-standing matter of contention for academic scholar (Choi 
& Beamish  2004).  Further  most  of  the  IJVs have  adopted  a  50-50  equity  share 
ownership control thinking that it is easier to set up an equal control between the foreign 
and the local parent (Killing 1983). The opinion regarding the use of 50-50 joint venture 
has been controverted over the time. Among the paper selected in this research, Killing 
(1983), Ding (1997), Mjoen and Tallman (1997), and Yan and Gray (2001) support the 
hypothesis that MNC should secure a dominant control when undertaking an IJV. By 
contrast, Beamish (1993) and Yan and Gray (1994) insist on sharing equally the control 
with their local partner as much as possible. Later on, a different way of structuring 
control in IJVs based on the abilities of the partners has come out through Choi and 
Beamish (2004)’s work described below. The government structure is a critical stage on 
the establishment of management control which can affect negatively or positively the 
performance  and survival  of  the  IJVs.  Furthermore,  Kogut  (1988)  claims  that  “IJV 
structure is the result of a negotiation process between foreign and local partner”. In the 
separation of control,  bargaining power has a considerable role to play in particular 
when the equity share is not 50-50. 
 
It is obvious that every joint venture has constraints on the manner of managing the 
venture and should decide independently and according to them. However, the theories 
of management control justify the claim that MNCs should think more on the way they 
mediate their equity in their partnership with the other foreign companies.
Choi and Beamish (2004) have contributed to IJV literature about the allocation control 
possibilities that an IJV has, by identifying the different mode of managing control. In 
fact, they have established a framework (figure 5) dealing with the management control 
between a MNC and a local partner making shape of 4 different modes: (1) the equal 
equity  of  control  (50/50),  (2)  the  dominant  control  of  the  foreign  parent,  (3)  the 
dominant control of the local parent, and (4) the split management control. They have 
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tested their model on 150 IJVs in South Korea and discovered that the split management 
control allocation works better than the others. They found out that with such a system, 
the IJV performance is affected positively than applying the others alternatives. As the 
context of the research done by Choi and Beamish (2004) is the same as the current 
study, the empirical result will be examined in contrast.
Figure 5. Four ways of partitioning control between JV partners (Choi & Beamish 
2004: 205)
On the graph above, the perspective of control is disclosed from the amount of control 
of the parent firms over its own abilities (vertical axis) and the abilities of the local  
partner (horizontal axis). The four ways proposed by Choi and Beamish (2004) depend 
only on the amount of control on the skills and knowledge of each partners. Their vision 
does not include the concepts of quantity of equity ownership and bargaining power. 
Nevertheless, the four different styles of management control presented below, will take 
into account the concepts of equity ownership and bargaining power – not included by 
Choi and Beamish (2004) – in order to have a broader approach.
- The equity share 50/50: there is an exact amount of control between the parent(s) and 
the  partners  of  the  venture,  usually  only  two companies  are  involved.  This  way of 
organizing  control  suggests  that  each  partner  of  the  venture  has  to  agree  on  any 
decisions before taking them. As stated previously, this method has been spread widely 
because of the idea of having an equal share of the responsibility within the venture 
(Killing  1983).  The  concept  seems  ideal,  as  Killing  (1983)  claimed,  it  makes  the 
partners of the IJV doubtful and inefficient. At the mean time, this situation has  also 
advantages  as  it  may  replace  a  relationship  of  control  with a  more  friendship 
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relationship. In fact, IJVs may have a more thoughtful focus on the great achievement of 
their partnership than on whom is controlling what. Further, Gray (1996) advocates that 
more control the parent company share with their local partner, the more they perform. 
However, in the case disagreements happen within the JV, it is difficult to solve the 
conflict because of the absence of clear role about control. Finally, it has been observed 
that most of the 50-50 joint ventures do not share equally the JV’s activities as they 
should accordingly the equity ownership (Schaan 1983). Hence, either the parents of the 
JV,  either  the  local  partner  takes  a  stand  on  the  control  of  the  latter  as  it  will  be 
explained next. (Choi & Beamish 2004)
- Dominant foreign parent control: the foreign parent has the most responsibilities over 
the joint venture (over 50%). In this situation, the parent of the venture has the full 
power on the venture. It is clear that decisions are taken from the parent side which can 
have  both  positive  and  negative  effects  on  the  strategic  alliance.  On  one  hand,  in 
contrast to the present situation of a 50-50 equity JV, it is clear that the parents of IJV 
have control over the activity. The parent companies lead and decide the direction that 
the venture has to take (Mjoen & Tallman 1997). On the other hand, it can be seen as an 
abuse of power:  the local  partner  can percept  a “one-sense” interest  on the venture 
without  taking  any  advantages.  Naturally,  the  IJV itself  will  make  the  principle  of 
behaviors and a situation that parent companies need to apply a strict control due to the 
protection of competitive advantage or technology patents. (Choi & Beamish 2004)
- Dominant local parent control: the local partner has the most responsibilities over the 
IJV (over 50% of the equity share). It is interesting to give control to the local partner 
when the trust between partners is well established (Fryxell, Dooley  & Vryza 2002). 
Moreover, in the case the role of the local company is to bring a marketing approach of 
the country, this latter needs freedom on the decisions. Indeed, the local company as this 
determinant advantages of knowing and having the abilities of penetrating the market. 
(Choi & Beamish 2004)
-  Split management control: the control of the venture is divided not according to the 
equity ownership but to the abilities and activities of each partner performing into the 
joint venture (Choi & Beamish 2004).  In fact,  based on the investigation why IJVs 
achieve low performance, they found out that the reason why is due to “a lack of or 
erosion of resource complementarity between the JV partners” (Choi & Beamish 2004: 
204). The local partner brings new assets to the parent company however it has to be 
managed with another style in order to exploit them adequately. The split management 
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of control influenced by the abilities of the partners enables the joint venture to take the 
full  benefit  of  the  competitive  advantage  of  the  partner.  Furthermore,  in  this 
management style, the bargaining power has been erased of the management control 
process.  Thus,  the  role  of  each  partner  of  the  IJV  regarding  control  is  clear  and 
appropriately defined. (Choi & Beamish 2004)
To sum up, Choi and Beamish (2004) have identified four ways of dividing control into 
IJVs which have been examined in this part. They all have pros and cons depending on 
the situation of the strategic alliance.  However according to Choi and Beamish (2004: 
211) “split control ventures perform better than all other  management control styles”. 
They are convinced that IJV performance is the result of the proper management of the 
competitive advantages of the JV partners through an adequate control structure. 
Lu and Hebert (2005) have a similar reasoning. They support the fact that equity share 
is not the sole factor in action to achieve performance but the mix of the governance 
structure with the initial condition of the JV as it is summarized in the figure 6. As a 
result, the most important fact to note is that an appropriate control structure leads to the 
partner firms to integrate the IJV’s activities with their overall strategies (Zhang & Li 
2001) which can be summarized shortly by leading to performance. Thus, by focusing 
on the control division through the skills and knowledge of the partner, respectively, the 
use  of  bargaining  power  is  not  required  on  the  elaboration  of  the  control  structure 
compare to  other  solutions.  Nevertheless  bargaining power is  in  practice present  on 
every IJV as it will be more described next.
Figure 6. Equity control and IJV performance: a transaction cost-based contingency 
framework (Lu & Hebert 2005: 737)
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2.7. Bargaining power and control
It has been viewed quickly in the last part that bargaining power plays a significant duty 
on the establishment of the management control of an IJV.  In this part, this argument 
will be further developed. Lu and Hebert (2005) argue that the initial conditions of the 
joint venture are more important than equity control. It means that the upfront factors of 
the IJV decision appear to be more significant than the elaboration of the equity control 
itself. Nguyen and Larimo (2009: 10) claim that “IJV control structure is the result of a 
negotiation process between foreign and local partners”. Indeed, the first step of a JV 
creation  is  to  establish  the  agreement  to  make  justice  judgments  about  the  fair 
distribution of control  in the IJV (Barden  et  al. 2005). It  is  in this  social  exchange 
between  the  partners  that  power  distance  takes  place  and affects the  IJV structure. 
Furthermore, Hamel (1991) identified a dilemma in the IJV management control: while 
the goal of an IJV is to cooperate together in order to achieve an accomplishment, a 
joint  venture involves as  well  a competitive dynamics  between the partners.  In  this 
sense, the control system used to monitor and influence the alliance, is also utilized as a 
source to impose power and authority. Those are the reasons why bargaining power has 
such an importance into the control management setting and later on the performance.
Bargaining power has been perceived as a negative occurrence in the establishment of 
IJVs. Even though the oriented goal of a strategic alliance is to establish a win-win 
situation, every partner of the joint venture will tend to maximize their control share in 
order to full fill their interest (Yan & Gray 2001). It needs thus that the actors of the IJV 
have  a  adequate  relationship  involving  trust  (Fryxell  et  al.  2002)  and  similar 
perspectives as it will be shown in the next part (Luo et al. 2001; Fan 2011). In fact, the 
quality of the inter-partner working relationship was found to have a strong, positive 
relationship with the achievement of strategic objectives for both partners (Yan & Gray 
2001). As control is a part of the IJV management process, this step cannot be avoided 
and forced partners to agree together before starting their strategic alliance. 
Moreover, the origin of bargaining power comes from the context (context based) and 
resources (resource based) of the venture (Yan  & Gray 2001).  The context-based is 
explained by the situation and the environment  of the JV. It  examines what  are the 
alternatives about management control and also the needs for the partner to have more 
equity according to its strategy. The other sources suggested by Yan and Gray (2001) is 
resource-based built with capital and non capital resources. Capital resources consist of 
a  financial  contribution  through  sets  or  their  equivalent  in  physical  or  proprietary 
 43
properties while non capital-based consists of the contribution of intangible resources 
such  as  technology,  expertise,  marketing  channels,  and  political  networks.  Then, 
management  control  is  established  and  will  be  proved  later  whether  or  not  the 
bargaining  power  step  has  been  led  efficiently  if  the  outcomes  of  the  venture  are 
positive. The following figure (figure 7) summaries Yan and Gray’s (2001) approach.
Figure 7. A model of parent control in IJVs (Yan & Gray 2001: 396)
In the definition of control, it has been advanced that control is a way to protect the 
company’s advantage  and  resources.  Zhang  and Li  (2001)  argue  that  the  level  of 
protection  through  control  goes  across the  amount  of  power  that  the  partner  may 
acquire. It is during the step of establishment control that the rules will be cleared about 
who can do what and under which conditions. 
Finally, bargaining power have been investigated from an internal perspective of the 
joint venture, however, it appears as well as an external factor that the companies has to 
consider while establishing the JV. In fact, the government takes the role of a third part 
into the negotiation and has the power on the decision made about the venture (Luo et 
al. 2001). In some countries – China for example, the government can be reluctant to the 
penetration  of  foreign  companies  into  their  territory  due  to  internal  control  or  a 
protectionist  regulation  of  the  local  activities.  It  is  more  particular  true  in  under-
developed  countries.  Moreover,  foreign  parent  should  be  aware  that  the  host 
government tends to acquire a majority of share and control JVs for strategic reasons. In 
particular,  they  aim  to  develop  through  commitment  of  financial  resources 
commensurate with their holdings which often is lacking (Boateng  & Glaister 2002). 
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Therefore, it  is  important  to  consider  external  factors  in  the  agreement  of  the 
management control.
To conclude, establishing control involves the use of bargaining power for obtaining a 
position over the partners according to the goals, the situation and the environment of 
the joint venture. Further a third part such as the local government has to be taken into 
account as they affect the settlement and the control of the venture. It has been seen that 
an IJV is also a competitive dynamic between  its partners led by  its strategy  and its 
objectives. This last point leads directly to the next more serious objection regarding the 
differences of perspective of control between the JV partners. 
2.8. The difference of perspective of control between foreign parent and local partner
The inter-relationship between partners as developed before, involves trust and a similar 
vision on the venture in order to achieve the performance expected. This part will focus 
on the difference of perceptive of management control between a foreign parent and its 
local  partner.  The  perception  of  management  control  tends  to  be  different  from  a 
company to another one. It is just as convincing to argue that due to the fact that control 
is  defined  in  different  manners (see  “2.1.  Definition  of  control”),  it  can  also  be 
interpreted and applied in different ways as it will be shown next. 
The conception of control is perceived through the environment of the company such as 
culture and the local regulations.  To take a simple example, in the Korean language, 
control is translated by   조 종 which found its root in the combination of two Chinese 
characters   操縱 which could be translated in English by “keep things busy”. Without 
going any into details on the analysis, it would not be exaggerated to argue that control 
is  apprehended differently.  As management  control  and IJV performance have been 
chosen as the scope of this thesis, the influence of culture will not be further developed. 
However, the empirical results will be aware of the impact of the latter. 
Moreover, management control can be also under the authority of the host government 
through regulations and  power. The intention of the host government is to incite the 
local partner to think and act in a certain way. Previously, the argument that developing 
countries tend to install a high level of control to protect the local market (Luo et al. 
2001)  and acquire  new skills  and knowledge (Boateng  & Glaister  2002) have been 
suggested. Nevertheless, the outcomes of this initiative appear to be divided. Choi and 
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Beamish  (2004)  account  for  a  negative  performance  over  the  joint  venture  due  to 
intense position of the host government over the JV. In contrast, Contractor and Lorange 
(1988), Luo et al. (2001), and Boateng and Glaister (2002) have seen an opportunity in 
spite  of  the  challenge  to  negotiate  with  the  local  administration.  The  fact  that  the 
investment  is  government-mandated,  it  involves  a  guarantee  on  the  alliance  and  a 
support  on  its  success. Nevertheless,  despite  the  government’s  conditions, the  local 
partner will try to supervise the venture  over the government’s position (Boateng  & 
Glaister  2002).  Therefore,  these  lines  of  argument  lead  to  the  conclusion  that 
establishing an IJV involving the government affects the management control due to its 
incongruity control.
2.9. Inside, outside, private and collective control
In  this  last  part  presenting  theories  about  management  control  in  IJV,  the  different 
factors influencing control in itself will be presented. In the part “2.2. The interrelations 
of IJV factors linked to control”, the factors presented were related to the relationship 
with control and more specifically the factors in conflict to achieve performance. In this 
part,  the  interrelations  between the  different  actors  of  the  joint  venture  such as  the 
parents,  the  government  and  the  shareholders,  and  control  will  be  introduced. 
Furthermore, the decisions taken by those actors can be for their own interest or the one 
for the venture, therefore Luo’s (2007) classification of control will be proposed and 
utilized in this section. 
In the chapter “2.4. The multidimensional approach of control”,  the theory made by 
Geringer  and Hebert (1989) categorized control  into three dimensions: control  focus, 
extent  and mechanism. Now,  in Luo’s  (2007) approach,  control  is  divided into two 
classes:  the  collective  control  and  the  private  control.  The  results  of  controversial 
studies have pushed Luo (2007) to look at the reasons of this cause. He discovered “a 
lack of separation of control” (2007: 532) and decided to establish a framework based 
on the origins of the decision. Thus, he separates control according to the source of the 
decision and its target as described below.
Private control: it involves decisions made by one party of the venture with the purpose 
of increasing their own advantage. 
Collective control: in contrast, collective control involves mutual decision made by all 
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the parents of the joint venture to achieve a cooperative advantage.
Furthermore, private and collective controls can be distinguished in nature (unilateral 
vs. bilateral), goal (private gain vs. collective gain), objective (fulfilling own interests 
vs.  ensuring  IJV  success),  scope  (narrow  vs.  broad),  and  mechanism  (Luo  2007). 
Nevertheless, it will be idealistic to assume that the decisions made are under a total-
trusting relationship or a total-bargaining relationship (Yoshino & Rangan 1995; and 
Child et al. 1998; cited in Luo 2007). They, in fact, vary between these two extremes. In 
any IJV, there are factors from both sides – trust and bargain – which coexist and co-
play at the same time as it will be more analyzed in this part with the Fan’s (2011) 
theory. To have a better understanding of private and collective control, Luo (2007) built 
a matrix (figure 8) showing the different situations of an IJV according to its level of 
private and collective control. 
Figure 8. 2 × 2 Matrix of Private and Collective Control (Luo 2007: 534)
From this  matrix,  the  achievement  of  performance  of  the  venture  according  to  the 
combination of private and collective control can be inferred. The Cell II and Cell III 
where their configuration gathers the two extremes (high-high or low-low) point to an 
ambiguous relationship  while Cell IV with a low private and high collective control 
accounts for a trustful and successful relationship. Finally, conversely to the Cell IV, the 
Cell I with a high level of private control and a low level of collective control shows an 
examination of the situation for  further  actions  from the side doing private  control. 
Luo’s (2007) approach shows as well that higher is the level of collective control, higher 
are the probability to success. It should not be concluded that private control should be 
banned in order to achieve better performance as private control and collective control 
complete and influence each other (Luo 2007). Nonetheless, it is necessary to associate 
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who could affect collective and private control to complete Luo’s (2007) assumption 
which will be carry out with Fan’s (2011) theory.
Fan’s (2011) approach consists of the analysis of the different elements composing the 
parents  of  an  IJV.  Invariably,  the  parents  of  an  IJV  were  limited  to  the  parents 
companies themselves which operate the venture. Fan (2011) considers the parents of a 
joint venture every factors  or actors that affect directly or indirectly the alliances.  In 
fact, the parents’ firms of the ventures are not only the unique source of control. Fan 
(2011) identified other sources outside of the JV parents that alter control and its target. 
He designated them: the parent inside control and outside control according to its origin. 
Inside control is defined by the control that a parent has over IJV activities through its 
‘own people’, while outside control regards control  to  the same activities but  through 
‘other people’ – the managerial team of another partner of the venture. Furthermore, 
other  forces  overcome the  decision  made.  For  example,  the  ownership,  the  overall 
bargaining  power  and  the  shareholder  agreement  affect the  decisions  made.  The 
framework made by Fan (2011) (see figure 9) illustrates the different flows of inside 
and outside control with the different forces affecting them.
Figure 9. Theoretical model of inside and outside control in IJVs (Fan 2011: 31)
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companies exercised.  In  fact,  the  control  they  conduct  targets  the  activities  of  the 
venture which is managed by both the management team of their company and the one 
from their  partners.  These two flows are  altered with the  effect of the equity based 
ownership,  the overall  bargaining power and the shareholder  agreement.  The equity 
based ownership and the overall bargaining power influence the weight of the decision 
made  through  inside  control  called  determinants.  The  power  given  through  these 
determinants  affects  the  decisions’  value  and  effect.  However  sole the  shareholder 
agreement has influence only on outside control. Moreover, logically, it is shown that 
the equity based ownership affects the overall bargaining power which itself affects the 
shareholder agreement to finally affect the whole JV. It can be noted that in contrast to 
Mjoen  and Tallman’s (1997) model (figure 3), the way ownership affects bargaining 
power is reversed.
In this model, some elements affecting as well control do not appear on it. Fan’s (2011) 
has judged that parent control varies depending of the parent management’s skill and 
expertise, and the organizational culture within parent firms. It may also vary according 
to  the  environment  of  the  alliance  such  as  whether  the  venture  takes  place in  a 
developing  country.  These  lines  of  arguments  lead  to  emphasize  the  importance  of 
indirect factors of control which can direct control to a misdeal if not taken into account 
during its establishment. 
To sum up, the approach of Luo (2007) and Fan (2011) emphasized the effects of the 
different  actors on control  and performance.  Luo (2007) shows that  decisions  made 
about control can be divided between private and collective action depending on their 
intention of their purpose. On the other hand, Fan (2011) demonstrates the inside and 
outside dependences of the action taken. Together, they justified the notion of interest 
into the source of the decision maker. Consequently, control is forced by elements from 
inside and outside of the venture for private and collective purposes in accordance with 
their interests.
2.10. Summary of the management control theories
This  second  part  of  the  present  thesis  concentrated  on  the  theoretical  approach  of 
management  control  into  IJV from previous  research.  It  has  presented  the  different 
assumptions of how control has been studied and viewed without considering the results 
of those researches. IJV has been in fact studied for almost half a century and most of 
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the  investigations suggest  various  answers  while  applying  them.  Naturally  the 
environment  and  the  specificity  of  every  joint  venture  make  the  situation  unique, 
therefore only general approaches and more specific theories have been presented. The 
purpose of the literature review is to gather theory about the topic to acquire a large 
amount of knowledge. Later in this paper, they will be pulled together in a framework 
(figure 13 at the end of the section 3) in order to analyze management control in French-
Korean joint ventures in South-Korea. 
Yet a universal definition of management control has not been found in the previous 
academic  investigations,  it has  been  described  in  different  ways.  Nevertheless,  as 
control  and  performance  are  linked  together  in  many  cases  including  this  study, 
management  control  could  be  defined  widely  as  the  orchestration  of  decisions  to 
optimize performance. Then, some theories about management control and in relation 
with  performance  have  been  examined  to  present  the  location,  constitution  and 
functioning of management control within an IJV. Following the examination of these 
paradigms, a questionnaire (see  Appendix 1) has been made in order to  analyze and 
understand management control and performance in the joint ventures studied as it will 
be more developed in the part “4.2.2. Data collection and results”. 
To sum up, the table 4, summaries  the theories analyzed in every sub chapter of this 
part.  It  highlights also  the key points of management control that this  research will 
analyze.
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Summary of the main facts studied in the management control theories
2.2. The interrelations of 
IJV factors linked to control
Based on the Mjoen and Tallman’s (1997) framework, the architecture of a 
IJV is represented with its components and how they are linked each 
other. It shows that the elements of an IJV do interact each others. As a 
conclusion, the IJV factors interacting with management control have 
been identified and analyzed in the following parts.
2.3. Killing's approach of 
joint venture control
Killing (1983) have founded a theory about  management  control which 
has  been  expanded  and  controverted  afterwards.  Its  theory  consists  of 
defining  control  with  three  elements  (formal  agreements,  staffing  and 
influence techniques).  However, its approach tends to give advantages to 
the foreign parent of the venture, hence its critics.
2.4. The multidimensional 
approach of control
Geringer  and Hebert  (1989)  have  developed  an  approach  about 
management control composed of three dimensions: control focus, control 
mechanism and control extent.  Later, their work has been supported by 
many other theories.
2.5. Control structure, 
autonomy and independence
During the life of a joint  venture,  the alliance evolves according to its  
situation and  external  atmosphere.  The arguments  stressed  in  this  part, 
show that if the level of control decreases, the venture is able to work by 
itself and tends to become autonomous. 
2.6. Equity share and 
control allocation
While establishing an IJV, the main part consists to divide the 
responsibilities and control. It has been found four approaches of how to 
divide ownership in an IJV: equal 50/50, foreign parent dominant, local 
parent dominant and split control.
2.7. Bargaining power and 
control
Control may be defined as the level of power and authority. To determine 
the level of control, the degree of bargaining power of each partner will 
decide  everyone’s  responsibilities.  Bargaining  power  is  based  on  the 
context and the resources of the company.
2.8. The difference of 
perspective of control 
between foreign parent and 
local partner
Control aims basically to check that the objectives have been fulfilled. 
While the parents are socioculturally different in an IJV, they think, expect 
and act in a different way than the others. Thus, common goals and 
perspectives are necessary for the well being of the venture.
2.9. Inside, outside, private 
and collective control
The actors of the IJV (parents, government, shareholders,..) express their 
interest through decisions for their personal interest or for the ones of the 
venture
Table 4. Summary of IJV management control
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3. INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURE PERFORMANCE 
The chapter 3 is the last part of the literature review of this research. After analyzing the 
management control’s paradigms, the theoretical perspectives of IJVs performance will 
be introduced. Based on the previous research presented in the “1.3. Literature review of 
previous research”,  the  methods to measure performance  will be reviewed. Moreover, 
the factors and actors affecting JV’s success will be also reviewed in this part. At last, at 
the end of this chapter, a theoretical framework of the theories analyzed in this literature 
review will be proposed and adapted to this study. It aims to suggest a base to conduct 
this research.
3.1. Definition of IJV performance
The major difficulty in evaluating IJV success is due to the lack of a clear definition and 
measures  of  performance  itself  (Robson  et  al.  2002;  and  Larimo  2010).  As  in  the 
definition of control (2.1. Definition of management control in IJV),  IJV performance 
faces to the same issue when it comes to be identified: absence of universal definition. 
Performance can be defined simply as the achievement of the respective objectives of 
each parent. However, in practice, it happens that it is more complex. Characteristically, 
the concept of performance leans towards to change according to their interpretation and 
the manner it is measured from both parents of the venture (Geringer & Hebert 1991). It 
is thus challenging for MNCs to evaluate accurately the effectiveness of their venture. 
Regarding the literature written about IJV performance,  the astonishing thing is  that 
many studies focus on the relationship between  one or several  various variables and 
their influence on IJV performance. However, in a majority of them, the analysis of IJV 
performance  itself  has  been  neglected  in  favor  to the  variable  studied.  They  found 
mainly that  those  factors affect the joint venture itself but does not adduce a  proper 
interpretation of IJV performance. Consequently, some papers have been written turning 
on IJV success only. Among them, Geringer  and Hebert (1991), Robson et al. (2002), 
and Ren et al.  (2009) have in particular participated strongly to the establishment of 
theories of  performance in  IJVs.  In  this  part,  the work from Ren et  al.  (2009)  and 
Robson et al. (2002) will be especially used as references because of their complete and 
recent work,  and their inclusive approach of IJV success. Some other relevant articles 
such as Demirbag and Mirza (2000), Luo et al. (2001), Boateng  and Glaister (2002), 
and Larimo (2010), will be also used in this literature review in spite of their focus on 
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specific  area  or  context  of  IJV  performance.  Thus,  from  these  previous  literature 
articles, performance will be defined and analyzed as it will be shown next. At a first 
place,  a  clarification  of  the  term of  IJV performance will  be  given,  followed by a 
presentation  of  the  variables  affecting  IJV  success  and  method  of  measuring  IJV 
performance.
Although  the  different  theories  of  control  were  introduced  in  the  chapter  2,  a  link 
between  management  control  and  performance  was  frequently  present.  From  this 
approach,  performance  can  be  defined  as  control.  According  to  Hamel’s  (1991), 
performance  is  limited  by  what  control  is  monitoring  (essentially  financial  and 
objectives) but this perspective obscures the actual and real performance of the venture. 
It is what Lu  and Hebert (2005) illuminated later. They regard IJV performance as a 
function of the fit between a parent firm’s strategy and its control structures, rather than 
solely  the direct  outcome of  control  exercised.  On the  other  hand,  14 years  earlier, 
Geringer  and Hebert  (1991)  defined  IJV performance  as  the  excess of  its  parents’ 
objectives and the consideration of success by at least one of the parents. Finally, even 
nowadays a clear definition about IJV performance has not been found yet as well as an 
appropriate  conceptualization  and  measurement  of  the  latter.  Buckley  and Glaister 
(2002 cited in Ren et al. 2009: 807) supposed the “lack of agreement originated from 
the hybrid structure and transitory nature of alliances” as the reason of this failure. As a 
consequence, it is difficult to find a  satisfying compromise on what IJV performance 
extend to. 
To simplify the interpretation of the effectiveness of a venture, IJV performance has 
been thought to be reduced to the simple question: “Are you satisfied?”  asked  to the 
managers of the venture (Boateng and Glaister 2002). Indeed, the global satisfaction of 
the venture is measured through the personal assessment of those managers. In fact, it is 
not  possible  to  find  an  answer  to  this  question  through  quantitative  data.  Thus  the 
answer depends of the personal expectations and observations of those managers. It is 
important to note that this question requires taking a stance while replying. Since a joint 
venture has rarely a unique objective, the answer related to the global satisfaction of the 
venture has to consider the gathering of several conclusions (the ones measured through 
control and the others which cannot be measured). Hence, the conclusion of assigning 
IJV performance as both a tangible and an intangible consequence.
On top of defining IJV performance, the chosen element and the method used to obtain 
the aftermath of the success of the joint venture seems to raise a point. The questions of 
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what kind, where and when to settle indicators appear strategic to measure adequately 
the  effectiveness  of  such  an  alliance.  This  contradicts  the  interpretation  of  IJV 
performance cited above which defined IJV performance as control. Indeed, indicators 
and measure are control themselves. It would not be exaggerated to affirm that MNCs 
aspire to analyze and quantify every factor influencing the outcomes of the venture to 
give an estimation of their performance. To take a simple example, several authors have 
identified  a  large  amount  of  variables  that  companies  can  use  to  measure  the 
performance of their venture (120 determinants affecting IJV performance have been 
identified by Robson et al. (2002) while scanning previous literature of IJVs). In this 
way,  every  factors  affecting  the  global  achievement  of  the  strategic  alliance  are 
weighted which could lead the overall results on the wrong direction. Indeed, although 
IJV performance is abstract, the adequacy of the results of the measure may happen 
distorted. In order to respect the actual value of performance, not all of the factors have 
to be chosen in the determination of the IJV performance. Moreover, in this way of 
measuring performance, it can be though that the final results may appear to be arranged 
to claim the necessity  of carry on or not the venture.  The consequences of using a 
method with an excessive evaluation of IJV performance’s factors would question the 
credibility of the outcomes of the measures, and the assessment and meaning of  IJV 
performance. The mechanism to determine IJV success has to suit the venture and the 
manner to measure accordingly the concerned factors as it will be shown next (3.2. 
General approaches of IJV performance).
As a conclusion, IJV performance has been studied for more than four decades but a 
clear definition could not be established  yet.  One of the reasons is due to the  lack of 
agreements from  the  difference  of  structure  and  the  natural  evolution  of  the  joint 
venture  (Ren  et  al.  2009).  Nevertheless,  IJV  theory  has  an  idea  of  what  IJV 
performances extend to and how to measure it despite the controversies of some studies. 
IJV success depends first on its definition – because of culture matter, and on both the 
effects of some factors and the measurement of performance itself. Furthermore, it has 
been  seen  in  this  definition  that the  environment  and  the  personal  situation  of  the 
venture make the evaluation of the venture unique. As a result, the choice of the factors 
to study and its measurement method have to be appropriate in order to obtain valid and 
reliable assessment of IJV performance. 
Following this definition, a general development of IJV performance will be presented 
in the part “3.2. General approaches of IJV performance”. It will be examined that the 
relation between factors and methods affecting IJV success. Then, the IJV performance 
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measurement will be developed in the part “3.3. Methods to measure IJV performance”. 
Finally,  a more  in  details development  of  the  factors  related  to  IJV  success  and 
management  control  will  be  analyzed  in  the  part  “3.4.  Variables  affecting  IJV 
performance”. 
The table 5 summarizes the key concepts of IJV performance reviewed in this part.
Summary of the key concepts of IJV performance
- Achievement of the objectives targeted from at least one of the parents
- Depends on the method and definition of performance within the venture
- Limited to the outcomes of control
- Could be minimized to the global satisfaction of the venture
- Performance is tangible and intangible
- Tends to be limited to indicators’ measure
- Performance is affected by a large amount of interrelated variable
Table 5. Summary of the key concepts of IJV performance
3.2. General approaches of IJV performance
The international business literature has identified many factors affecting IJV success 
but according to the situation of the venture, some elements appear to be irrelevant with 
the influence of the IJV performance (Ren et al. 2009). Companies  have to  chose and 
utilize adequately the variables to  obtain an accurate  measure of their  performance. 
Nevertheless,  in this  thesis,  the review of variables will  be made  according to  their 
relation to management control and IJV performance.
Ren et al. (2009) have developed a theoretical approach (figure 10) based simply on 
what could be measured or not. They have divided the factors affecting performance 
into two categories: the performance drivers (factors being not able to be measured) 
and, the performance measured (factors being able to be measured). Thus, performance 
can be calculated from the tangible part of IJV performance which is defined by “the 
performance measured” and adapted through the intangible part, the observation of “the 
performance drivers”. In the present thesis, this approach will guide the accession of 
IJV performance theory. 
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However, despite their in-depth review of factors influencing joint venture success and 
the approach of measuring performance, Ren et al.’s (2009) model is not exhaustive. To 
complete  the  theoretical  perspective  of  IJV  performance,  some  other  theories  and 
approaches will be added. For instance, Robson et al. (2002) have undertaken research 
on the previous studies about IJV performance. They have found 120 determinants and 
10 performance measurement approaches that they gathered according to their overlaps, 
and  theoretical  or practical  meaning.  They finally  obtained 74  determinants  and  7 
approaches that they categorized them into 14 groups and then into 5 principal construct 
types – background, antecedent, core, external and outcome. These 5 principal construct 
types  will  structure  this  literature  review.  From mainly  this  two approaches  of  IJV 
performance and some others, a global presentation of IJV success will be elaborated in 
this  part.  Despite  the  fact  that  these  two  approaches  include almost  every  factor 
affecting the performance of the venture, only the dominant variables will be examined 
with  a  more  in-depth  approach  regarding  the  variables linked  to  the management 
control. 
Figure 10. A longitudinal Model for Studying IJV Performance (Ren et al. 2009: 825)
The figure 10 describes simply the main variables affecting IJV performance and the 
measuring methods of it according to Ren et al. (2009). In the frame on the left, the 
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performance drivers are represented as well as what they respectively affect. On the 
right, the approaches of performance measurement are outlined. In between, a second 
frame  represents  the  “cross-level  factors”.  They  characterized the  inter-partner 
relationships and the role of the human resources in the achievement of  IJV success. 
Already  with  the  analysis  on  the  foreign-local  relationship  and performance  in  IJV 
(Demirbag  & Mirza  2000),  the  human  resource  relationship  between  each  parent 
company has been seen as a factors influencing IJV satisfaction. It will be gone more 
into details later with Demirbag and Mirza’s (2000) framework. According to the figure 
10,  the  performance  drivers  affect  IJV  performance  mainly  through  the  variable 
“control”  and  “trust,  conflict,  cooperation”.  The  arrow  between  “Control”  and  the 
assessment of the objectives provide evidences about the correlation of the two latter. 
Moreover,  it  is  interesting to note that the financial  performance is  isolated and not 
linked to the achievement of the objectives but to the satisfaction of the venture. As a 
conclusion, the model shows explicitly that IJV control, which measures qualitatively 
the performance of joint venture has a straight effect on the objective achieved by the 
partners. In contrast, control does not affect the financial performance and satisfaction 
of the venture.
If  we  compare  Ren  et  al.’s  (2009) framework  with  the  theoretical  approach  of  the 
relationship between control and performance made by Mjoen and Tallman (1997) (see 
figure 3), it is interesting to notice that the variable identified by the authors are similar. 
However,  the ties  between those variables  are  different  and the  development  of  the 
model is more detailed in Ren et al.’s (2009) framework due to the natural evolution of 
theories. This comparison shows that the factors affecting performance are the same but 
their interpretations have changed.
Among  IJV literature  about  IJV performance,  Robson  et  al.  (2002)  had  brought  a 
complete methodical, analytical, and focused review of the previous empirical studies 
examining the factors affecting IJV performance. According to the frequency of use, 
they have selected 74 determinant and 7 methods that they classified into 14 categories 
for the determinants and 3 for the methods, and finally into 5 principal construct types 
(background, antecedent, core, external and outcome – the last one concerns only the 
methods) which will be developed next. In the present paper, the attention will be paid 
only  on the  classification  on  itself  in  order  to  have  a  better  understanding of  what 
factors to focus to achieve performance in an IJV. The table  6, summaries Robson et 
al.’s (2002) concepts.
 57
Variables Determinants
Background variables 
(the ability of the 
company to undertake 
successfully an IJV)
Intra-partner characteristic: it is the international experiences and 
cooperation, its global mindset and its size.
Inter-partner fit: it is the sociocultural distance, the goal congruence between 
the partner, the size symmetry, ...
Antecedent variables 
(the structural and 
processual aspects of 
IJV development)
Venture demographic: concerns the information about the age, the size and the 
number of parents.
Contractual elements: measure the agreement made by the parents of the 
venture such as the equity ownership and parental contribution.
Managerial characteristic: same as the contractual element, but regarding the 
human resources itself.
Control and supervision: discuss the level of control between the JV partners 
Project-specific relational aspects: involve the inter partner relationship for 
example: conflict, trust, commitment.
Organizational learning: examine the knowledge transfer between partner s.
Core variables (the 
strategic factors to 
attain a high level of 
performance)
R&D and technology: the technological sophistication of an IJV is a channel 
for technology transfer.
Production: the production cost, the rationalization and specialization may 
have an impact on IJV performance.
Marketing: is the study of the 4 Ps (Price, Product, Place and promotion).
Human Resources: HR involves on top of its allocation, the turnover, the job 
satisfaction, the training and more.
External variables 
(parents have a little or 
no control)
Industry Characteristics: give attention to the impact of the industry factors on 
the joint venture.
Environment: outline the law and political situation of the host country.
Outcome variables 
(concerns the IJV 
performance 
assessment 
approaches)
Financial outputs: measure of the IJV performance based on the profitability 
and sale growth of the venture.
IJV stability: estimation of the rate of unexpected dissolution in order to assess 
the longevity of the venture.
Multidimensional: gathers the methods of performance assessment based on at 
least two performance facets such as market and financial growth.
Table 6. IJV performance determinants and methods according to Robson et al. (2002)
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From another perspective, Luo et al. (2001) established a concise model (see figure 11) 
summarizing the main factors influencing the satisfaction of IJV performance. More 
precisely, their approach focuses on four factors (Equity share, Goal incongruity, Parent 
competencies,  and  Cultural  distance)  which  concern  and  link  both  tpthe  local  and 
foreign  parent  of  the  venture.  Luo et  al.  (2001)  argue  that  the  control-performance 
relation differs between the local and foreign parents’ perspectives and is asymmetric. 
The fact that the parents of the venture have a different background, the approach of 
control as much as performance differs according to the 4 factors studied.
Figure 11: A model of dual parent perspective on control and performance in IJVs (Luo 
et al. 2001: 48)
As cited previously,  Demirbag and Mirza  (2000) built  a  framework (see  figure 12) 
based on the parents’ relationship,  commitment,  conflict  and control  of  the venture. 
Their concept started from the theory according to Anderson (1990). He argued that the 
unique and most important indicator  to drive JV success is the harmony among the 
parents. In fact, despite harmony does not guarantee a high performing joint venture, it 
is  difficult  to  imagine  a  venture  that  succeed  while  partners  are  suspicious  and 
conflicting  (Anderson  1990).  Harmony  within  the venture  prevents as  well  from 
negative conflicts. Habib (1987) classified conflict behavior form passive resistance to 
overt aggression. Having a positive relationship may avoid hard tensions between the 
partners. As it is shown below, Demirbag and Mirza (2000) illustrated harmony – called 
“inter partner relationship” – with the balance of conflict and control on one side and 
commitment on the other side. But what has to be noticed is that in their perspective, 
conflict and control do not have a negative sense and position over the venture. They, in 
fact,  claim that conflict is a part of the life of a joint venture but commitment has the 
role  of  equilibrating  in  order  to  achieve  performance and satisfaction  (Demirbag & 
Mirza 2000).
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Figure 12: Factors affecting joint venture performance (Demirbag & Mirza 2000: 4)
To sum up, this  part  presented  several  general  approaches  emphasizing factors  and 
methods influencing performance in IJVs. Through the frameworks from Demirbag and 
Mirza (2000), Luo et al. (2001), Robson et al. (2002), and Ren et al. (2009), the process 
to achieve IJV performance has been studied. To conclude, IJV success is the results of 
the  right  coordination  of  the  JV components  and  the  method  used  to  measure  the 
outcomes of the venture. Those two elements (methods and factors) will be reviewed 
more in detail  in the  following parts  “3.3. Methods to measure IJV performance”  and 
“3.4. Variables affecting IJV performance”.
3.3. Methods to measure IJV performance
Based mainly on the works done by Robson et al. (2002) and Ren et al. (2009), the 
different performance measured will be introduced in this part. As most of the studies 
concentrate on the relationship between one or two variables and their influence on IJV 
performance, not many articles show the method of how to assess the outcomes of such 
alliances. These presented methods below will be all utilized in the empirical part of this 
research to determine the relationship between management control and performance 
within an IJV.
3.3.1. Financial output measures
The  financial  output  measures  have  been  the  IJV  performance  approach  the  most 
appreciated in the IJV literature (Ren et  al.  2009).  Based on the basis of objectives 
indicators such as return on investment, market share, or sales growth, the performance 
of the venture is appraised (Robson et al. 2002). Moreover, the objective measures are 
preferred when all the variables are obtained from the same source in order to avoid 
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variances on the measures (Ren et al.  2009).  It happens that the mode of measuring 
differs from a company to another. Despite the large use of this method, it has been 
criticized because of the financial measures “tend to be rolled into consolidate corporate 
data” (Ren et al. 2009: 810). However, firms are still using this method because of its 
results  and try to extend the measure to subjective approaches.  Indeed, more recently, 
some studies  have operationalized financial  performance using perceptual  measures. 
These  measures  were  based  on  the  managerial  assessment  of  IJV  economic  goal 
attainment  and company share price reaction to the public announcement of an IJV 
strategy (Robson et al. 2002). Financial measures are increasingly used with subjective 
performance measures and it will be more developed in the explanation of the outcome 
variable: “3.3.3. Multidimensional assessment”. Such integration increases the validity 
of the results obtained and the quality of the measure (Ren et al. 2009). 
 3.3.2. IJV stability
Another common indicator while assessing IJV performance regards the stability of the 
venture. As a joint venture aims to be sustainable only as long as it represents the most 
efficient organization mode (Inkpen and Beamish 1997), it is considered that longer the 
venture survives, the more successful it is. In this sense, the venture is considered as 
successful when the parents carry on the alliance and as a failure if it breaks down (Ren 
et al. 2009). Moreover, the IJV stability variable gives estimation on the stability of the 
ownership of  the  venture  and may prevent  from an unintended ending (Inkpen and 
Beamish 1997). An instable ownership involves significant changes into the life of the 
alliance. Whether the situation is unstable but positive for at least one partner, then the 
joint venture may move toward a wholly owned subsidiary, otherwise it is negative and 
the alliance may break down. However, despite it is fully objective, always accurate and 
easy to interpret (Anderson 1990), this perception of JV success is limited. It obscures 
the fact that the termination of a joint venture can be a sign of success. Indeed, due to 
the accomplishment of their initial objectives, the alliance is stopped. Or, due to high 
performance, “it prompt one parent firm to buy out the other and turn the venture on a 
wholly  owned  subsidiary”  (Ren  et  al.  2009:  808).  Finally,  the  conceptualization  of 
longevity as a sign a failure would be inappropriate (Yan  & Zeng 1999) or must be 
analyzed with the original motive of the venture to be in adequacy (Ren et al. 2009). 
The same authors suggest as well that the analysis of IJV performance gains reliability 
by being coupled with another facet such as sales growth, as it will be shown next with 
the multidimensional assessment approach further developed by Robson et al. (2002).
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3.3.3. Multidimensional assessments
The multidimensional assessment of IJV performance is  built  on the analysis  of  the 
correlation of several facets of IJV performance (Robson et al. 2002). As the amount of 
combinations  is large, just the most relevant and the most used  combinations  into the 
IJV performance assessment will be described. The rational for this approach may not 
be related to the venture longevity or financial outcomes seen previously, but more to 
the  extent  to  the  IJV  initial  objectives  (Luo  1999).  Therefore  it  is  based  on  the 
managers’  perceptual  judgments.  These  managers are  usually  asked  to  self-rate 
performance on: (1) give an overall viewpoint on satisfaction with performance or goal 
achievement,  and  (2)  provide  indications  along  multiple  and specific  outcome 
dimensions (Robson et al. 2002).  Thus, the correlation between their perspectives and 
the indicators is established.
Overall  satisfaction:  The  overall  satisfaction  is  built  on  the  managers’ subjective 
evaluations of the IJV performance (Ren et al. 2009). According to Anderson (1990), JV 
should be evaluated primarily by the managers with independent entities in order to 
maximize their own performance, not the parents’ expectations. Then, this evaluation 
should be evaluated again by items designed to measure IJV managers’ evaluation of 
their venture’s overall performance. Although, the overall satisfaction is a common used 
performance measure, its reliability has been criticized. On top of being subjective, the 
overall satisfaction is made by the manager from each parent of the venture, so from 
different cultures. The manner that the foreign partner judges satisfaction with its own 
set of criteria and interpretation, may be interpreted differently from the local parent. As 
a result, the satisfaction may differ depending on whom is surveyed (Ren et al. 2009).
Goal achievement: In contrast with the precedent variable, “goal achievement” focuses 
more  specifically  on  the  evaluation  of  the  objectives  of  the  venture  itself  and  the 
parents’ individual objectives (Ren et al.  2009). The purpose of a joint venture is to 
achieve  together strategic  goals  by  complementing  each  parents’ need.  Thus,  each 
partner has its own interests and purposes on the JV’s activities on top of its common 
goals. As goal achievement is measured according to each partner firm’s perspective for 
the reason explained, different evaluations are conducted accordingly. If the difference 
between the results  made by the JV parents is too high, they are compared with those 
found by the managers of the IJV. In this way, it increases the overall accuracy of the 
measure (Luo 2008).
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Learning: From a knowledge-transfer based joint venture, this argument for JV creation 
has become a measure for IJV success (Ren et al. 2009).  Even though that the main 
motivation  of  the  IJV  formation  is  not  knowledge  transfer,  the  transfer  of  critical 
knowledge and skills is  more and more considered as an essential subordinate goal of 
IJV. The interest of acquiring new intangible resources from its partners – in particular 
for SME, is to increase their savoir-faire and their opportunities. The amount of learning 
gathered is measured through managers’ satisfaction with their experience within the 
venture.  As seen before,  due to  a  personal  subjective approach of  the measure,  the 
accuracy of the outcomes is  reassessed.  Furthermore,  the results  of this  observation 
challenge the real performance of the venture for the reason that it is a subordinate goal. 
The  assumption  underlying  this  is  that when  knowledge  transfer  is  not  the  main 
motivation for such an alliance, measuring the managers’ knowledge accumulation for 
personal purpose is not equivalent to  a valuable variable of the global performance of 
the  venture (Gong et  al  2007,  cited  in  Ren et  al.  2009).  Finally,  from the  learning 
perspective, IJV termination can be considered as a success or a failure depending of the 
skill and knowledge acquired (Ren et al. 2009).
3.4. Variables affecting IJV performance
Based mainly on the works done by Robson et al. (2002) and Ren et al. (2009), the 
different  variables  affecting  IJV performance will  be  introduced  in  this  part.  Other 
works  such  as  Larimo (2010),  Luo  et  al.  (2001),  Boateng  and Glaister  (2002)  and 
Demirbag  and  Mirza  (2000)  will  complete  these lines  of  arguments.  The  variables 
affecting IJV performance will  be presented according to the classification made by 
Robson et al. (2002).
3.4.1. Background variables
Goal congruity: According to several studies (Luo et al. 2001 and Boateng & Glaister 
2002), the convergence of objectives leads to a greater perception of IJV success. In 
other words, the goal congruence is considered as the base of a JV as the alliance of the 
two or more companies will work together for the same goals. Nevertheless, Ren et al. 
(2009) highlight that parents’ goal compatibility affects the relationship quality between 
the partners,  hence its effect  on the JV satisfaction. Thus,  the goal congruity has an 
effect  on  the  performance,  but  also  indirectly  on  management  control  as  control 
measures the well achievement of the target. This facet of control will be examined in 
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this study.
Culture  and  social  distance:  It  seems  obvious  that  a  sociocultural  (and  physical) 
distance between partners heightens the abilities to work together. However, Morosini, 
Shane  and  Singh (1998)  have  demonstrated  through  a  valuable  research  (52  cross-
border  acquisitions) that  culture  has  a  positive  impact  on  the  performance  of  their 
sample.  It  is  difficult  to  have  a  position  on  the  question  as  each  IJV appears  in  a 
different  environment  and situation which lead to  a different  conclusion (Luo et  al. 
2001; Robson et al. 2002; Ren et al. 2009; and Larimo 2010). As the cultural factor 
needs a more in depth study, this factor will not be tested in the research. Nonetheless, 
we can assume that culture affects negatively the success of the venture as the French 
culture are opposite to the Korean according to study about culture done by Hofstede 
and Hofstede (2005). 
International experiences:  Previous experiences appear as a positive factor for IJV 
performance.  They are  characterized  by  several  actions,  for  instance:  the  previous 
international  or  local  JV that  the  partners  undertook, hosting  a  foreign company or 
doing cooperation.  Ren et  al.  (2009) insist  that the lack of previous experiences on 
international cooperation is a negative factor affecting the performance of the venture. 
This idea has been also carried out later on by Larimo (2010). Despite the evidences, 
this assignment will test out this element in the context of MNCs doing a joint venture.
3.4.2. Antecedent variables
Bargaining power: As mentioned before, bargaining power is linked to the difference 
of size of the partners because of higher abilities among the partners of the venture. It 
has been seen as well that bargaining power has also an impact on control (see “2.7. 
Bargaining power and control”). Now it will be shown that bargaining power has also a 
strong impact on IJV performance. Researchers have called our attention on the fact that 
a  parent  company with  more  power  than  others,  tends  to  achieve  their  desired 
performance because it obtains control over the venture (Yan & Gray 2001). Moreover, 
Luo  et  al.  (2001:  44)  reported  that  “local  parents  may  use  the  host  government’s 
bargaining  power  and  institutional  interference  to  strengthen  their  positions  for 
monitoring  and  controlling  IJV operations”.  Whatever  the  origin  of  the  bargaining 
power,  its  final  impact  plays  an  important  role  in  the  performance  of  the  venture 
including its longevity. In a country, such as South-Korea, where the economic growth 
is increasing dramatically compare to the rest of the world, the use of power arises to be 
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a  protection  and  help  on  the  challenge  of  the  globalization  for  local  companies  to 
perform better. The analysis of bargaining power in French-Korean joint ventures will 
be relevant on the effect of control on the venture performance.
Control:  It  would be  an  exaggeration  to  say  that  management  control  is  obviously 
linked to IJV performance because of the large amount of controversies regarding the 
control structure-performance link. Luo et al. (2001) claim that some parts of control – 
because control is a large term, may affect parents’ satisfaction  and IJV performance. 
The fragmentation of control is also a concept assisted by Ren et al. (2009). In fact, they 
hold  that  control  is  divided  in  three  divisions made  by  Yan  and  Gray  (2001):  (1) 
strategic  control,  (2)  Operational  control  and  (3)  structural  control  (see  “2.4.  The 
multidimensional approach of control”), may differentially influence IJV performance. 
Furthermore, as Martinez and Ricks (1989; cited in Demirbag & Mirza 2000: 6) put it, 
“the extent of control of a parent company stems from both its formal authority and its  
ability to influence affiliates”. In other words, IJV performance seen through control is 
the result  of the type of mechanisms and systems that a parent company is  able  to 
develop and implement. This obscures the fact that for many years, IJV performance 
was determined mainly by the outcomes given by control. Control is on the center of the 
decision  of  IJV performance  and  it  is  the  reason  why  it  has  long  been  a  topic  of 
international  theory (Eisenhardt 1985 cited in  Luo et  al.  2001).  The purpose of this 
thesis is so to elucidate the relationship between management control and performance 
in French-Korean JVs.
Inter-partner relationship: Doing a joint venture means to cooperate with one or more 
partner (Ren et al. 2009). Therefore it involves relationships with the different partners 
of the venture. The term of “inter-partner relationship” has been used by Demirbag and 
Mirza (2000) to  integrate  inter-partner  cooperation,  inter-partner  trust  and long-term 
reciprocal behavior into one factor. These three elements interact and are dependent of 
each  other.  Relationship  within  a  venture  is  likely  to  influence  the  alliances’ 
performance because relationship is needed at every stage of the venture life. However, 
this factor is considered as a  long term performance dimension (Demirbag & Mirza 
2000), therefore a longitudinal study is preferred to analyze it. While this study is cross-
sectional, the  analysis of the  factor “inter-partner relationship” with IJV performance 
may not  be  the  most  accurate  way  but  it  will  be  nonetheless  examined within  this 
research. Inter-partner relationship interacts with trust, conflict and commitment  as it 
will be exposed next. 
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Trust:  “Trust  is  the  willingness  of  a  party  to  rely  on  another  party’s  actions  in  a 
situation involving risk and uncertainty” (Mayer, David  & Schoorman 1995: cited in 
Ren et al. 2009). Trust is as well multilevel and complex as it relates to relationship 
between persons, groups, organizations and inter-organizations. As is has been said, the 
relationship between the partners are likely to influence IJV performance. In particular, 
trust  has  been  linked  with  financial  performance  in  several  studies  (Nakos  and 
Brouthers 2008; and Luo 2002). However, for the same reason than the factor “inter-
partner relationship”,  trust  needs a longitudinal study to be tested  (Ren et  al.  2009). 
Indeed,  it  is  recommended  to  undertake  time  into  consideration  in  order  to  assess 
appropriately  the  outcome  of  this  factor  on  IJV performance.  The  analysis  will  be 
nonetheless reviewed in this study.
Conflict: Conflict has been defined as “an overt behavior arising out of the process in 
which one unit seeks the advancement of its own interest in its relationship” (Habib 
1987; and Schmidt & Kochan 1972: cited in Ren et al. 2009: 819). Conflict appears as 
well  in  many  forms  from a  passive  resistance  to  an  overt  aggression.  Despite  that 
conflict is characterized by anger, frustration, and other negative feelings (Ren et al. 
2009), it shows a dynamic process consisting of latent, perceived, affective, manifest, 
and  aftermath  stages.  Furthermore,  because  cultural  difference,  a  situation  called 
“conflict” in one country may not be considered as a conflict in another one (Ren et al. 
2009)  As  a  result,  it  is  difficult  to  define  what  ‘conflict’ is  exactly  and  to  find  an 
influence  with IJV  performance  unless  through  a  longitudinal  study  as  Hyder  and 
Ghauri (1993) did between Swedish MNEs and local Indian companies. This factor will 
not be taken into account into this study. 
Commitment:  In Demirbag  and Mirza’s (2000) framework  (figure 12), conflict  and 
control are represented as a force on one side of the factor “inter-partner relationship” 
and commitment as another force on the opposite side. Commitment brings stability to 
the joint venture due to trust and responsibilities that partner give each other. Ren et al. 
(2009)  describe  commitment  as  the  partner’s  positive  valuation  of  a  collaborative 
relationship. It is a long-term interest and gain in the relationship as it is based mainly 
on trust (Demirbag & Mirza 2000). From the same authors, they argue that it is relevant 
to  connect  IJV  performance  with  the  willingness  of  the  JV  partners  to  contribute 
resources (or provide a market for output) in a manner that accommodates the JV’s 
needs.  As a part  of the inter-partner  relationship and for the same reason explained 
previously, commitment will not be studied in this work.
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Equity stake:  Equity stake has been among many studies one of the key factors to 
achieve IJV performance (Luo et al. 2001; Robson et al. 2002; and Boateng & Glaister 
2002). Through the factor “equity stake”, it is regarded that the balance of tangible and 
intangible  resources  between  the  venture  partners  are  significant  to  achieve  IJV 
performance.  In  fact,  the  partner’s resources  bring  to  the  other  partners skills, 
knowledge  and  opportunities.  It  is  true  in  particular  with  MNCs because  of  their 
financial matter.  Large companies have the opportunity to “hire managerial expertise 
and support research and development which enhances the firm’s competitiveness and 
performance”  (Boateng  & Glaister  2002:  530)  and  have  more  physical  supplies. 
However, if the difference of resources is important, the “bigger” partner involves an 
imbalance of bargaining power (Larimo 2010). Because of its better resources than the 
other, the partner firm takes indirectly more control.  Exchanging resources is often a 
motivation to undertake an IJV as it aims to exchange knowledge and techniques by 
working together (Robson et al. 2002). Nevertheless, it is usually more interesting for 
the foreign parent as it expects to gain from its local partner about the country specific 
knowledge (Luo et al. 2001). In the context of management control,  JVs with parents 
having high  level of  competency, coordinates and manages more easily their alliance. 
Indeed,  the  resources of  one  partner  complete  the  lack  of  the  other firm  partners 
(Robson et al. 2002; and Luo et al. 2001). More to the point, Choi and Beamish (2004) 
found out that a lack of or erosion of  complementarity between the JV partners has a 
negative impact on IJV performance.  In the present thesis, each  selected  IJV involves 
French and Korean MNCs, this relationship between equity take and performance will 
be thus checked. 
Ownership:  Whatsoever  the level of ownership (equal 50/50 ownership, a dominant 
parents control (either the local or the foreign firm) or a split control  –  see: Choi & 
Beamish 2004 in the part “2.6. Equity share and control allocation”),  its influence on 
IJV success has been one of the most reviewed variable (Larimo 2010). However, the 
results  of  those  studies  have  been  mixed  and  mostly  indicating  a  non  significant 
relationship between ownership and IJV performance. As the ownership distribution has 
been shown as  a  part  of management  control,  this research will  give  it  a  particular 
attention – especially because Choi and Beamish (2004) have undertaken a study on a 
sample of 71 international JV in South Korea regarding this topic. They have found that 
a  JV with its ownership based on a split control has better performance  while other 
ventures adopting other  ownership styles  do not show a particular advantage.  In the 
present study, the case companies have either a 50:50 ownership or a foreign parent 
dominant control with one running a split control management style. 
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3.4.3. Core variables
R&D and technology: the R&D intensity of a venture is determined by the amount of 
exploration  activities  that  the  parents  of  the  venture  undertake  together.  R&D  and 
technology are usually a reason to undertake a JV in order to develop new concepts and 
learn from each other (Robson et al. 2002). Furthermore, they are well-known to be a 
factor of success. As the director of ITT automotive argues, “technology and products 
drive long term success” (Sierra 1995 cited in Choi & Beamish 2004: 205). In fact, 
working on a same technology signifies as well a strong cooperation between the JV 
partners and leads the team to motivations. As a conclusion, R&D and technology lead 
the  alliance  because  of  the  involved  common  motivations,  but  affect  the  goal 
congruence of the venture. This factor will be reviewed in this research as most of the 
selected alliances involved an R&D department.
Human resources: The HR allocation determines the amount of staff that each partner 
will  involve on the venture  management. Their presence and role into the venture are 
critical. In fact, the general assessment of the joint venture will be based on the feeling 
of those managers (Boateng and Glaister 2002). Thus, it is just as convincing to say that 
the  human  resources  has  an  effect  on  JV performance.  Nonetheless,  when  it  is 
contrasted to the control-performance relationship, the evidences appear less relevant. 
Obviously, the human resources have the role to monitor and control the venture, but the 
study of this  variable has not been very popular and  pertinent for the IJV literature 
(Larimo 2010). In this thesis, our attention will be paid on the amount of staff and its 
eventual effect on control and performance.
3.4.4. External variables
Justice and Law: Justice and law concern the taxes, the governmental legislations and 
notes through  processes  and  rules.  While  doing  a  joint  venture,  the  foreign  parent 
analyses the local legislation regarding the FDI in order to determine the feasibility of 
the alliance. In fact, the local government opens or closes its boundaries according to 
the country’s situation. If the local legislation tries to avoid foreign investments, then a 
protectionist  regulation  will  be  set  up.  In  contrast,  if  the  country  looks  for  foreign 
investments, they will open special economic zone (Robson et al. 2002). More focusing 
on  justice,  Ren  et  al.  (2009)  highlight  that  justice  has  been  recently  the  target  of 
researcher with a positive effect on IJV as a conclusion. Nevertheless, justice will not be 
more developed in this paper as it is linked to the local culture and is complex itself. As 
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regulations are a part of control mechanism – defined by Geringer and Hebert (1989), 
their  integration  on  this  research  is  needed.  It  is  even  more  important  as  Korea 
legislation tends to  welcome investors in its  territory due to a large amount  of free 
economic zones. The fact that Korea is opening its boundaries to FDI can be interpreted 
as a positive economic growth for the country which is continuously increasing and for 
the investors too (Larimo 2010). 
Political environment: In complement of the “justice and law” variable, the political 
environment completes the approach of the external factors affecting IJV performance. 
It reflects the uncertainty over the continuation of the present economic and political 
conditions and the government policies (Larimo 2010). The political environment of the 
hosting country has an impact on the venture success if the latter is uncertain (Robson et 
al. 2002; and Larimo 2010). Indeed, changes in government may cause issues related to 
FDI  legislation  such  as  taxation,  repatriation  of  earnings  and  licenses  (Delios  and 
Henisz  2000,  cited  in  Larimo  2010).  In  the  case  of  South-Korea,  the  political 
uncertainties are based on the controversial situation between North-Korea and South-
Korea, and the preference that the government gives to local MNCs in order to protect 
the local economic growth. The conflict between the North and the South of the Korean 
peninsula  is  ambiguous  as  officially the  two  countries  have  not  signed  any  peace 
agreement. Furthermore, the Korean government will try to give priority and right to its 
own companies for economic reasons. The political uncertainty of South-Korea and its 
influence on the IJV located in its territory will be tested without going into details.
3.5. Summary of the IJV performance theories
To sum up,  in  this  part  the IJV performance literature has been reviewed.  Through 
mainly the approaches from  Robson et al. (2002) and Ren et al. (2009), the methods 
utilized to assess the IJV performance and the factors affecting it have been identified 
and analyzed. Due to the large amount of factors and the interest in this thesis of the 
effect of management control on IJV performance, this literature review focused mainly 
on the factors associated to management control. Further some factors reviewed will not 
be taken into account in this study  despite of their relation with management control 
(see table 7). In fact, some variables need a deeper focus on the topic such as “culture 
distance”, and some others need to be analyzed through a long period of time such as 
the variable related to “commitment”. However, the methods used to assess IJV success 
have been all reviewed and each of them will be tested in this research. On the table 7 
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summarizes the factors and methods examined in this literature review and the selection 
of those which will be tested on the present thesis.
A large  amount  of  variables dependent  of  management  control  and  affecting  IJV 
performance  has been  found  as  it  has  been shown  on  the longitudinal  model  for 
studying IJV Performance (Ren et al. 2009: 825 – figure 10). This assumption maintains 
the  fact that there is a  relationship between  management control and the  JV  success. 
Furthermore,  the existence  of  multiple-ties between  those  two  entities makes  their 
analysis  complex  to  study.  To  decide  if  there  are  or  not  evidences  on  the  role  of 
management  control  in  IJV  performance,  it  is  necessary  to  take  into  account  the 
variables concerned. In the case it would not be possible, the validity and the reliability 
of the study would be challenged.
Methods reviewed Method tested in this study
Financial output measures
IJV stability
Overall satisfaction
Goal achievement
Learning
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Factors reviewed affecting IJV performance Factors tested in this study
Goal congruity
Culture and social distance
International experiences
Bargaining power
Control
Inter-partner relationship
Trust
Conflict and commitment
Equity stake
Ownership
R&D and Technologies
Human resources
Justice and law
Political environment
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes and No
Yes
Table 7. List of the factors and methods examined in the literature review, and selected 
for the use of this thesis
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In the review of the methods assessing IJV success, every variable observed has its pros 
and cons about its outcomes. Among the recurring issues discovered, culture difference 
has been seen as an important  factor affecting the manner to define and analyze IJV 
performance. In fact, the definition and the application of the assessments tend to vary 
according  to  the  culture.  Thus,  the responses  obtained  change  from a  company  to 
another one.  Moreover, in particular in the “outcomes  variable”, the  approach of IJV 
performance  is more  subjective  than  objective.  Except  for  the  “financial  output 
measures” and the “IJV stability variable”, the analysis of the other factors is based on 
the managers’ personal opinions of the venture. Due to these two main issues – culture 
distance and subjective approach, different responds are provided which lead a threat on 
the validity of the measures. To achieve accurate results, it has been suggested that the 
IJV performance analysis from both local and foreign parent’s managers and the parents 
themselves are confronted. 
To  conclude  the  literature  review of  this  thesis  and  introduce  the  empirical  part,  a 
framework  gathering  the  information  regarding  management  control  and  IJV 
performance and their relationship will be presented (figure 13). The purpose of the 
literature review is to introduce the concepts, approaches and theories about the topic of 
the research in order to 
The framework objects to emphasize what part to examine in the study of the relation 
according to the information gathered in the literature review. 
Figure 13. Theoretical framework of the thesis
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Management control
- Specific VS overall
- Ownership (50/50, dominant,
Split control)
- Inside VS outside
-Private VS collective
IJV performance
- Objectives of the venture
- Objectives of the parents
- Financial output
- Stability
- Overall satisfaction
- Knowledge transfer
Factors affecting the relationship between
management control and performance
External factors:
- Political environment
- Regulation
External actors:
- Shareholders
- Government
Strategy
-Decided by the venture
-Decided by the parents
Partner selection
- Previous experience
- Equity stake
- Goal congruity
- Ownership
- Duration of the JV
-HR allocation
External environment
Internal environment
INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURE
If low performance 
- Culture distance
- Commitment
- Bargaining power
- Trust, conflict and 
cooperation
- Inter partner relationship
Affecting the venture
 72
4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The fourth chapter of this study introduces the methodology and empirical context of 
the  study.  The aim of  this  section  is  to  review the  existing  theories about  research 
methodology and justify the reasons of the chosen methodology of this research. It will 
also describe the structure of the empirical research and method of the study. Then, the 
reliability and validity of the study  will  be analyzed.  At last, an introduction to the 
empirical context and the case companies will be presented. 
4.1. Research design
Having defined the research question and analyzed the literature related to the topic, the 
research methodology is the next step of the research process. The methodology of this 
research will be based on the so-called research process ‘onion’ developed by Saunders, 
Lewis  and Thornhill  (2003),  summarized on the table  8. It  consists of  six different 
layers in order to approach what kind of methodology the researcher should adopt for its 
work.  The elaboration of the research design  through this  model  will  start  from the 
second  layer  “Research  approach”.  In  fact,  the  “Research  philosophy”  layer  is  not 
appropriate to such study – Master thesis.
Layer Approaches 
1: Research philosophy Positivism, Realism, Interpretivism, Objectivism, 
Subjectivism, Pragmatism, ...
2: Research approaches Deductive or Inductive 
3: Research strategies Experiment, Survey, Case study, Action research, Grounded 
theory, Ethnography, Action research, ... 
4: Research choices Mono method, Mixed methods, Multiple-methods
5: Time horizons Cross-sectional, Longitudinal or Experimental 
6: Data collection 
methods 
Sampling, Secondary data, Observation, Interviews, 
Questionnaires, ... 
Table 8. The research onion (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2003: 83) 
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Research approaches
The research approach consists to determine the role of the theory within the research. 
There  are  two  ways  to  approach  the research:  deductively and  inductively.  The 
deductive approach means that the theory is already founded and will be tested in the 
research. This approach is usually used to check empirically the validity of hypothesis 
or  existing  paradigms. In  contrast, the  inductive  approach  consists  to  elaborate  the 
theory from the research. This way of approaching research aims to undertake a deeper 
study such as a grounded theory or even an ethnography research. As already mentioned 
in the  accession  of the  previous literature, the purpose of this research is to  suggest a 
theory about the relationship between management control and IJV performance in the 
context  of  French-Korean  joint  ventures.  In  fact,  while  many  studies  have  already 
focused on this topic, their results are controverted. Therefore, this study will suggest a 
theory  for  the  relationship between IJV management control and performance  in the 
specific context of French-Korean JV in South Korea.  There are the reasons why an 
inductive approach has been chosen for this thesis.
Research strategies 
There are  different strategies to undertake research which can be categorized into two 
groups: quantitative  strategy and qualitative  strategy. The quantitative methods aim to 
approach the research with variable measurements. Quantitative methods are usually 
conducted through surveys most of the time, but also through sampling, secondary data 
or experiment. On the other hand, qualitative method has the purpose of explaining and 
understanding the  phenomena  to  which  the  study focuses.  It  provides a  naturalistic 
approach that explores the subject of the study in a context-specific setting. Quantitative 
methods is made of a single or multiple-case study, a grounded theory, an ethnography 
or action research. The main difference between qualitative and quantitative research is 
not the “quality” but the procedure (Ghauri & Gronhaug 2005).  Qualitative research 
depends on weightings of qualities or characters while quantitative research depend on 
measurements, on statistics, or on counting (Maylor & Blackmon 2005). However, it is 
possible,  that  qualitative  data  are  quantified.  In  fact,  qualitative  and  quantitative 
methods are not mutually exclusive  as  it will be shown later  in the section “Research 
choices”. Finally, the appropriate research strategy depends on the sample used and the 
purpose of the research.
In this thesis, a quantitative research will be conducted with more specifically a multiple 
case  study  strategy.  Indeed,  the  purpose  of  this  research  is  to  establish  a  theory 
regarding the relationship between management control and performance in the context 
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of French-Korean JVs located in South-Korea. The question that the study will try to 
answer regard the reason “Why” and the manner “How” of the relationship. To answer 
this type of question, a subjective approach such as a case study is needed (Stake 1995). 
Furthermore, the  sample studied gathers a small and limited amount of cases.  In fact, 
less than  20 French  companies  are  currently doing  a  joint  venture  with  Korean 
companies. The  research  will  thus  focus  on  a  specific  context  which  is  also  a 
particularity of the use of a case study method (Yin 1993).  Due to this low amount of 
participant in the study, a multiple case study seems to be the most appropriate method 
to answer the research question. The multiple case study method aims to study the same 
questions  in  a  number  of  organization  and  then  to  compare  the  results  and  draw 
conclusions Ghaury (2004). However, Yin (2004) points out that using a multiple case 
study research findings is more convincing that when there are results from only one 
case.  In  other  words,  the  larger  the  sample  of  the  study is,  the  more  reliable  it  is. 
Moreover, despite that many paradigms already exist regarding this management control 
and IJV performance, some changes in the results have been noticed. This phenomenon 
of controversy comes from the environment  of the study.  As the result, management 
control and IJV performance theories are multifaceted. In this situation, doing research 
through a multiple case study gives the advantage to analyze a critical context (Ghaury 
2004). These lines of argument justify the need of using a quantitative research with a 
multiple case study strategy. 
Research choices
The choice of the research strategy is not  limited to one process. In fact, the strategy 
which suits the best to the needs of the study has to be adopted. The research choice can 
be mono method – using only one strategy, mixed method – using several strategies 
together, or multiple-methods – using several strategies but independently. The context 
of this study, as explained before, does not need to use several strategies to be studied. 
As a result, a mono method using a multiple case study strategy will be applied to the 
research. (Saunders et al. 2003).
Time horizons 
A research can be conducted under three different rhythms: cross-sectional, longitudinal 
and experimental. A cross-sectional research is based on a short period of time while a 
longitudinal  and  experimental  research on a  long time.  The cross-sectional research 
seeks  information at a specific and short time. The longitudinal research  accumulates 
data to capture a change, thus data has to be collected at least twice  during a defined 
time  period. Finally,  the  experimental  research  aims  to  compare  minimum two 
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equivalent situations and data have to be collected before and after the experience.  In 
this research, due to the short time invested on a Master thesis, the time horizon of the 
study is limited. As a result, the research will be cross-sectional. (Saunders et al. 2003).
Data collection methods
There are several sources and techniques to collect information and data for a multiple 
case study. Among the most used data collection methods, there are the questionnaire, 
the sampling,  the secondary data,  the observations and the interviews.  They all offer 
pros and cons and have to be chosen to accord  with the research. In the case of this 
study,  a  multiple  case study strategy will be used and the data collection will be done 
through interviews. Indeed, the interview is the best method to collect information when 
only  a  small  of  respondents  exist  (Daniels &  Cannice  2004).  Nevertheless,  the 
questionnaire  has  also  negative  side.  The  fact  that  there  is  a  contact between  the 
interviewer  and  the  interviewee  may  distort the  result  by  influencing  the  answer 
(Daniels & Cannice 2004) which will be more discussed in the  section “4.3. Validity 
and  reliability  of  the  study”. The  way  of  collecting  data  for  this  research  will  be 
developed more in details in the section “4.2.2. Data collection and analysis”.
4.2. Research method
Figure 14. Adaptation of the case study method from Yin (1994)
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The research method of the present thesis is based on the case study approach developed 
by Yin (1994) as shown on figure 13. This approach is composed of three independent 
phases:  (1) definition and design of the study, (2) data collection and results, and (3) 
Analysis and conclusion. They will be developed next.
4.2.1. Definition and research design
The first phase concerns the theoretical part of the study. It is composed of the definition 
of  the  research  question  which  was  the  part  “1.  Introduction”;  the  development  of 
paradigms about the topic which was the literature review: part “2. Management control 
in international joint venture” and part “3. International joint venture performance”; and 
finally the  approach of the research method, the  selection of the sample and the way 
data will be collected which is the part “4. Research methodology”. 
During this phase, the base of the study is made. The research question and the reasons 
of this study were presented. Then, the literature review of the previous research have 
been analyzed  in order to introduce the concepts and theories of management control 
and IJV performance. In particular, in this literature review, the focused theories have 
been selected because of their  interest  of the topic  and not because of their  results. 
Indeed, due to the large amount of controversy, it is interesting to see what factors has 
been involved into those studies without taking into account their  results.  In fact,  it 
would not be relevant to consider the outcomes of those studies as a common rule for 
every IJV while it may not work in this environment. Furthermore, the selection of these 
theories and approaches were based on their interest on  management  control and  IJV 
performance only. Nonetheless, some studies may have been forgotten due to the large 
amount of academic paper regarding those topics.
From the literature review, the functioning of management control has been analyzed 
and the factors affecting IJV performance identified. The purpose was to obtain as much 
as knowledge  as possible regarding this  topic  in  order  to  undertake research on the 
environment of French-Korean JVs. It is through a quantitative research with a multiple 
case study as a strategy that the study will be done. The manner of how collecting data 
will be more developed in the next part.
4.2.2. Data collection and results
In  the  second  phase,  the  empirical  part  of  the  study  is  presented.  It  regards the 
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interviews and the part “5. Empirical results”. It exposed the empirical results of the 4 
interviews.
Based on  the literature review,  a  questionnaire  to  examine the relationship  between 
management control and IJV performance  in  the environment of French Korean joint 
ventures located in South Korea has been made. The questionnaire is made of a set of 
33 questions divided into 5 themes: (1) Presentation of the interviewee, (2) Presentation 
of the joint venture, (3) Management control, (4) IJV Performance, and (5) Conclusion. 
The table 9 presents the purpose of each theme of the questionnaire.
Themes Purposes
1. Presentation of 
the interviewee
Introduction to the manager interviewed and brief presentation of 
the research (Question 1 to 4)
2. Presentation of 
the joint venture
Presentation of the case company, definition of the background 
details (Question 5 to 18) 
3. Management 
control
Definition of the management control established within the 
venture: actors and processes (Question 19 to 23)
4. IJV Performance Evaluation of performance of each case company, identifying the 
factors and actors affecting the performance (Question 24 to 29)
5. Conclusion General impression regarding the relationship control-
performance, conclusion of the interview: addition of some 
forgotten information (Question 30 to 32)
Table 9. Themes of the interview process and their purposes.
The questions  of the questionnaire are either open-ended questions either close-ended 
questions. The questions for the part 1 are composed mainly of closed-ended questions. 
In this way,  they are easy to answer while the respondents get more familiar with the 
interviewer and the topic of research.  Afterwards,  open-ended questions are asked for 
the rest of the interview. Such kind of questions gives the respondent recall freely and 
can take up a direction in the response. Moreover, the response may then be followed up 
with  more  specific  questions  from  the  interviewer  (Saunders  et  al.  2007).  Some 
questions in the part “2. Presentation of the joint venture”, have been taken from a study 
done by the University of Vaasa. During the interview, information about confidentiality 
of  the data  is also mentioned.  Finally,  the answer of  the empirical  research will  be 
presented according the 4 sections of the questionnaire. The questionnaire is presented 
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at the end of the study in the appendix 1.
The theory examined in the literature review will be tested in a sample of  4 JVs. The 
sample  chosen  for  this  study  gathers only  IJVs between  a French  and  a  Korean 
company running in South-Korea. In total, 11 IJVs have been identified (see table 13. 
List of Joint Venture in South-Korea involving French and Korean companies) and only 
5 joint ventures have been selected for this research. The selection of the cases has been 
based on the size and availability. In fact, the case company should be big enough to 
undertake such a study. Thus, 5 companies have been contacted and 4 have accepted to 
be a part of the study. The 5th company had to reject the interview due to their business 
sector (weapons). 
Ideally,  each case should use different  characteristics within the same context for the 
purpose of having distinct comparisons. For example, the table 10 shows what kind of 
cases would have been the most appropriate for this study. Indeed, the selection of each 
case has to be justified as every case has to serve a particular purpose (Ghauri 2004).
Ownership control
Pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
Min 10-49% 50/50 Maj 51/90 Split control
High Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4
Low Case 5 Case 6 Case 7 Case 8
Table 10. Ideal selection of case companies for this study
In reality, it is rare that this situation is accessible.  Usually, the selection of the case 
companies is based on their existence and availability for the research.  In the present 
thesis, the case companies were selected according to the location – South-Korea, size – 
multinational companies only, entry mode style – in joint venture, and the number of 
parents – two parents: one French and one Korean company. It could not have been 
possible to choose the company according to their performance and ownership control 
due to the limited amount of French-Korean JVs at this time. As a result, the sample is 
limited to only 4 cases with the ownership and performance characteristics as shown on 
the  table  11.  Each  case  will  be  presented  in  the  section  “4.4.  Introduction  of  the 
empirical context of the study”.
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Ownership control
Pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
Min 10-49% 50/50 Maj 51/90 Split control
High Case ACase C Case D
Low Case B
Table 11. Selection of case companies for this study
The data will be collected through a  face-to-face  semi-structured interview except for 
one interview which has been done by phone due to the lack of time of the interviewer 
of  the  Case  B.  The  face-to-face method  enables to  collect  a  rich  set  of  data  in  a 
relatively  short  period  of  time  (Saunders  et  al.  2007).  Indeed,  a  semi-structured 
interview is the best choice in these conditions. It enables to guide the interviewee to the 
topic of research by following pre-established themes and questions while allowing a 
certain flexibility.  In fact,  the interviewee is  offered the possibility to develop  more 
issues with open questions.  As a result, the interview becomes more interactive which 
may change  the  order  of  the  question from an interview to  another  and  add  some 
supplementary questions. 
Every interview has been held with a French speaking manager from the French parent 
company.  In fact, I have chosen to undertake interview in French as it is my mother 
tongue.  In  this  way, I  have  the advantage  to  communicate  more  easily  with  the 
interviewee and obtain additional  information  by breaking the language and culture 
barrier. 
At last, the interviews have been held during  January 2012 in Seoul  at the company 
office as I have the chance to be on the spot during this time to conduct personally the 
interview. Four interviews have been conducted lasting for 90 minutes on average. For 
two of them, the manager was the CEO of the venture. The outcomes of the interview 
will be then analyzed as it is explained next. 
4.2.3. Analysis and conclusion
The last phase aims to analyze and conclude the outcomes of the research which is the 
part “5. Empirical results” and part “6. Summary and conclusions”.
Once the data gathered, the 4 cases will be analyzed through a comparative case study. 
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According to  Saunders et al.  (2007),  in qualitative research,  the goals of data  analysis 
are to  comprehend and manage data,  to integrate the related data and  to  identify key 
patterns or themes emerging out from them. In simple words,  the interpretation of the 
data is about making sense out of text and imaged data. The evaluation of the outcomes 
is based on the personal comprehension of the researcher.
To end the thesis,  the research finishes with the conclusion part.  The study will  be 
summarized first and then concluded. In the conclusion, the limitation of the study will 
be reminded before the further research will be suggested.
4.3. Validity and reliability of the study 
To ensure the quality and the validity of qualitative research, Yin (1994) has developed 
four  tests:  (1)  construct  validity,  (2)  internal  validity,  (3)  external  validity,  and  (4) 
reliability.  These  four  tests  measure respectively  a  different  part  of the  qualitative 
research and make sure to obtain accurate results. Indeed, as it will be explained below, 
each  test  intends  to  show evidences  from different  perspectives  on  the  quality  and 
reliability  of  the  research.  The  validity  and  reliability  of  the present study  will  be 
defined through the four tests made by Yin’s (1994) tests.
The first test,  construct validity,  analyzes that  the right operational measures for the 
studied  concepts  are  well  established  (Yin  1994). This  test  is  the  results  of  the 
researcher’s initiative. In fact, he or she decides on what sources the evidence of the 
study will be based on, such as direct observations, documents, interviews and physical 
artifacts.  In  this  study,  I  took the decision to  undertake  semi-structured  face-to-face 
interviews.  In  fact,  such  interviews enable  to  create  trust  and  interaction  with  the 
interviewee (Shank 2006). Furthermore, as the interview will be with a French manager, 
the language  used to communicate  will be  my mother tongue.  It makes sure that the 
communication  between the researcher  and the  interviewee is  accurate  and will  not 
affect the results. If some misunderstandings happen, the information can be checked as 
the interviewees were willing to complete any details through phone calls or emails.
The  second  test, internal  validity, tests  the  causal  relationship  between  two  certain 
conditions, but concern only explanatory or descriptive studies (Yin 1994).  Therefore, 
as  this  study does not  belong to one of these two categories,  it  will  not  be further 
developed and applied in this thesis.
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External validity assesses the possibilities to generalize the findings of the different case 
companies to the case study (Yin 1994).  In fact,  the results of a case study rely on 
analytical generalizations while a survey research relies on statistical generalizations. 
As a result, a study on a large amount of case companies leads to a higher external 
validity. In this thesis, the amount of case companies studied is as much as 4. It seems 
small for such a research, but the amount of French-Korean JVs appears to be very 
limited at this moment.  However, it is sufficient to make a generalization out of them 
about  management  control  and  performance  in  French-Korean  JVs.  Some  further 
studies may be needed to validate this approach.
Finally, the  reliability test  has the purpose of making sure that the next investigations 
using the same material and analysis process find the same findings and conclusion (Yin 
1994).  This  last  test  may be controverted.  Indeed,  due to the natural  change of  the 
environment of the study and the evolution of theories, it may be not possible to find out 
again the same results if the study is undertaken a long time. Nevertheless, in this study, 
I have ensured its reliability by describing the design and process of the methodology. 
However, the reliability of the research is affected by  the fact that the identity of the 
interviewed  managers  and  the  name  of  the  case  companies  are  kept  private.  This 
decision was made to protect the privacy of the companies studied.  Furthermore,  in 
qualitative research, the data collected are based on a personal and subjective approach 
which may vary from a manager to another one. To conclude, it is difficult to achieve a 
perfect reliability in a qualitative research despite the effort made. The researchers have 
to be aware of the difference of result while undertaking studies.
To complete Yin’s (1994) approach, some other limitations affect as well the validity 
and reliability of the studies. The most important limitation is caused by the fact that the 
study is done only on the French side of the joint venture. Indeed, as my mother tongue 
is French, it is better to focus on the side that I have the most chances to obtain reliable 
information. However, this way may privilege the French partner of the joint venture in 
the research. In order to balance the study, it would be relevant to undertake as well this 
study from the Korean side made by a Korean researcher as it will be suggested in the 
part “6.4. Further research”.
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4.4. Introduction of the empirical context of the study
4.4.1. Introduction of South-Korea
South-Korea is the 14th major economy in the world  (10th for France)  and one of the 
country  with  the  highest  growth  rate  despite  of  the  2010  economic  crisis  (5%  on 
average during the last 10 years  – 1.3% for France). To keep on developing, South-
Korea tries to attract foreign investment by creating FEZ (Free Economic Zone). There 
are  currently  6 of  this  zone  offering  tax  advantages  for  foreign  companies  wishing 
setting up in Korea. Moreover, in October 2010, South-Korea and the European Union 
(EU) have signed a FTA (Free Trade Agreement) (EUROPEA 2010) and in October 
2011, South-Korea and the United-States (US) have also signed an FTA (USTR 2011). 
They aim to increase the trade between those countries by reducing Korean tariffs and 
tariff-rate quotas on goods.  It is important to note that Japan and China do not have 
access to this benefit. Due to this agreement, Korea and France may prone to work more 
together in the Korean territory. (FKCCI 2010)
On top of having tax benefits,  South-Korea offers  a  strategic  position  especially  for 
foreign direct investments from EU and the US. The location of the Korean peninsula 
supplies an ease to penetrate other Asian markets.  In fact, Seoul is only 2 hours away 
from Beijing and Tokyo.  Therefore,  it is an opportunity for companies  to benchmark 
themselves  to  other  Asian  country.  Moreover,  South-Korea makes  ease  on  the 
partnership  creation.  In  fact,  it  is  the  leader  in  several  sectors such  as  electronics, 
shipbuilding,  petrochemical,  car  industry  or  even,  biotechnology  and  information 
technology.  Further South-Korea tends  to invest  increasingly on the development of 
green energy. In 2009, the amount of FDI reached 133 billion USD and France was the 
7th country investing the most in South-Korea (1st EU, 2nd US and 3rd China).  (FKCCI 
2010)
The economy of South-Korea is characterized by a fast and increasing growth after the 
Korean  War  (1950  - 1953).  In  particular,  in  1960’s  under  the  Park  Chung  Hee’s 
government (1961  -  1979),  the forming of  Chaebols started.  The  Chaebol are some 
large, conglomerate family-controlled firms of South Korea characterized by strong ties 
with government agencies (Jwa 2002).
Finally, South-Korea is still officially in conflict with North-Korea and a war threat is 
often  reported by the  news.  The last  conflicts  were  in  November 2010 when some 
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artillery  fires  have  been exchanged between the  North  and South  of  Korea  on  Big 
Yeonpyeong island.
4.4.2. Presentation of the Case A 
The Case A has been founded in June 2003 between the petrochemical branch out of the 
69  branches  of  one  of  the Korean Chaebol  and  the  French  leader petrol  company 
through a 50:50 joint venture. Together, they are developing advanced products that are 
environmentally  friendly  in order to  be the world leader  supplier. The joint venture 
develops,  produces  and  sells  petrochemical  products such  as  polyolefins,  resin 
compounds  and  basics  petrochemicals;  for  variety  of uses  such  as  electronics, 
automobiles, textiles and chemical materials. It produces as well refined petrochemical 
solvent and LPG (Liquefied Petroleum Gas). Their production is intended to mainly the 
Chinese market (~50%) but also the domestic market and some other countries in Asia 
and Africa. Case A does not export to France, however, through this venture the Korean 
company buys raw materials from the French company. With a petrochemical complex 
structure composed of  13 production plants  based in  South-Korea,  Case A  employs 
about 1000 people including 9,8% of research and development engineers. In 2009, the 
turnover  of the case company A was over 4,7 trillion KRW. Moreover,  Case A has 
acquired during  their  alliance  a  number  of  certification  about  quality,  environment, 
safety and health such as ISO 9002, KOLAS, ISO 14001 and KOSHA 2000. (Source: 
Case A homepage on the internet and FKCCI 2010)
4.4.3. Presentation of the Case B
The  case  B  was  established  in  September  2000 between  a  French,  a Korean  car 
manufacturer  companies  and the creditor banks of the Korean company.  In fact,  after 
being  hitted by  the Korean  crisis  of  the  2000’s,  the  Korean  car  manufacturer  was 
looking for  a  potential buyer.  Finally,  it  is  between the French  and the Korean  car 
manufacturer with its creditor banks that a joint venture is built with 70% stakes for the 
French manufacturer, 20% for the Korean and  up to  10% for its  creditor banks. The 
condition of the venture was to  keep the current  human resources and all  functions 
including R&D. At this time, the joint venture sold only 12 000 vehicles per year. The 
purpose of the venture is to compete with the other local car manufacturer and built a 
manufacturing  car  platform  in  order  to  supply  Asian  countries – especially  China. 
Nowadays, the venture mode has moved to a subsidiary of the French company with a 
80,1% owned by the latter. In fact, it bought back the creditor banks’ stakes. The case B 
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employs about 5 600 people including about 45 French managers. It holds 10,1% of the 
local car market share with 161 917 vehicles sold per year just in South-Korea. In fact, 
the  production  capacity  of  the  Korean production  plan  reach the  300 000units/year 
which  are  exported  mainly  to Chile,  Mexico  and  some  countries  of  the  Gulf 
Cooperation Council  (GCC) such as Saudi-Arabia and Qatar.  The turnover  made in 
2009 in South-Korea reached the 3,6 billion KRW. (Source: Case B homepage on the 
internet and FKCCI 2010)
4.4.4. Presentation of the Case C
The Case C has been established in May 2008 between two important actors of the oil 
refined industry through a 50:50 joint venture. This joint venture produces and markets 
a  wide  variety  of  lubricants  ranging  from automotive  to  industrial  products.  Their 
products are designed for the domestic market and about 10% are intended to supply the 
French  company  subsidiaries.  In  fact,  the  Korean  market  has  a  high  demand  of 
lubricants because of the  important production of cars. Together, they aim to be more 
competitive on the local market for the purpose to be the third local leader of lubricant 
supplier. The Case C employs about 160 people including only 3 French managers and 
the  2009 turnover  was  about  176 billion  KRW.  (Source:  Case  C homepage  on  the 
internet and FKCCI 2010)
4.4.5. Presentation of the Case D
The last case is the result of the alliance of a Korean manufacturing rolling stock and an 
French international transport services company. The Korean  company is a branch of 
Chaebol while the French company is a division of French multinational specialized in 
collective services. The joint venture  is  held by 80% by the French company  and the 
rest by their partner.  In June 2007, they signed a 30 years contract starting in 2009 to 
build and operate one of the subway line of Seoul city. The objectives of the venture are 
to launch  and  stabilize the subway line for 30 years. At the end of the contract, the 
government will take over the management of the subway line. Finally, the purpose of 
the French partner is to settle down in Korea in order to be a local metro management 
company. The case D employs about  550 people  and 2009 turnover reached about 65 
billion KRW. (Source: Case E homepage on the internet and FKCCI 2010)
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4.4.6. Summary of the presentation of the case companies
To sum up, the table 12 summarizes the presentation of the 4 cases that will be used in 
the study.  All these joint ventures  have only 2 parents  – one from France, one from 
Korea, and they are all operating in South-Korea.
Case A Case B Case C Case D
French 
company
Fifth largest oil and gas 
company in the world 
2nd biggest French car 
manufacturer
Fifth largest oil and gas 
company in the world 
Transportation division of a 
collective services MNC
Korean 
Company
Petrochemical branch of a 
Korean Chaebol
Car branch of a Korean 
Chaebol
Korean petroleum and 
refinery company
Rolling stock manufacturer, 
branch of a Korean Chaebol
Establishment June 2003 September 2000 May 2008 June 2007
Industry Petrochemicals Automotive Oil Transportation
Ownership 50% - 50% 81% (French) - 19% 50% - 50% 80% (French) - 20%
Products Mainly petrochemicals 
products and LPG
Cars Lubricants for automotive 
and industrial products
Subway line 9
Purpose of the 
venture
Becoming the world’s 
leading chemical supplier 
and being ecological friendly
Compete the other local car 
manufacturer and built a 
manufacturing car platform
Becoming the third local 
leader of lubricant supplier
Building and managing the 
subway line for 30 years
Revenue (2009) 4,7 trillion KRW 3,6 billion KRW 179 billion KRW 65 billion KRW
Staff 1 015 (4) 5600 (45) 160 (2) 550 (3)
Distribution China (~50%), Domestic 
market, Asia and Africa
65% Domestic market and 
35% Chili, Mexico and GCC
90% Domestic market
10% French Company
Domestic market
( ) indicates the number of managers from the French company speaking either English or French.
Table 12. Summary of the case company study
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4.4.7. Presentation of other French Korean JVs located in South non-included in the research
JV’s name Industry Ownership Establishment Staff Turnover Activity of the venture
Dong-il Devanlay 
INC 
Casual Wear/ 
Textil accessory 
Non available May 2000 71 72,5 Billion 
KRW
Production and distribution of Lacoste 
products through 117 sales points
Yeang Chemical 
CO., LTD
Chemical & 
Environment
50/50 July 1998 99 116 Billion 
KRW
Production and distribution of water 
treatment chemicals and services related
Inergy Automotive 
systems CO., LTD
(not Korean)
Automotive 
Industry
50/50 but 
acquisition 
100% in 2010
August 2000 220 1,7 Trillion
KRW (Global)
Production and development of solution 
for the automotive world
NH-CA Asset 
Management
Finance French 40% 
Korean 60%
2003 60 17,5 Million 
KRW
Manage portfolio for Korean institutional 
and retail investors
Samsung Thales Electronics/
Defense
50/50 February 2000 1660 623 Billion 
KRW
Developing jointly a  broad spectrum of 
capabilities in defense system
Shinhan BNP Paribas 
Asset management
Finance 50/50 October 2002 190 125,5 Billion 
KRW
Manage portfolio for Korean institutional 
and retail investors
Valeo Pyeong-Hwa 
CO., LTD 
Automotive 
Industry
Non available 1988 650 328 Billion 
KRW
Development and production of power 
delivery systems for manual transmission
Table 13. List of Joint Venture in South-Korea involving French and Korean companies (Source: company’s homepage on the internet and 
FKCCI 2010)
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5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In this chapter, the empirical findings of each case company are presented and examined 
in  order  to  provide  a  holistic  picture about  the  subject  of  study.  At  the  end of  this 
chapter,  a  cross-case  comparison  table of the  analyzed case  is  conducted.  It  will 
summarize the presentation of the empirical results before the conclusions on the next 
section. The information presented in this part, are from the interviews done with each 
case company.
5.1. Case A
5.1.1. Presentation of the interviewee
The interview has been done with the Senior vice president of base chemicals exports 
and purchasing of the joint venture. This manager has been at this position for about 
more than 3 years and he is one of the 4 managers from the French parent company out 
of the 1100 people working in this venture. This manager is an expatriate under the 
responsibility of the French company with an unlimited contract for his position. 
5.1.2. Background of the Case A
The Case A was established in 2003 through a 50:50 joint venture with a no intended 
duration. In 2003, because of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the Korean company was 
loss-making and put up for sale. After a failure  with a  Japanese company,  the Korean 
company put  its offer on the European market.  The objective  of the Korean  Chaebol 
was to give a second life to their petrochemical  branch  in order to stay in the local 
competition. Interested by the facilities of the Korean company and its geographical 
location  to  penetrate  the  Chinese  market,  the  French company showed its  interests. 
Finally,  the  French company  decided to  buy out  50% of  their  capital  and raise  up 
together the new company  through a joint venture  in  order  to develop  a platform to 
produce together in South-Korea petrochemical products for the Asian market.
Despite the common goal  of the Case A, the personal interest of the French company 
differs from the Korean company. Indeed, the needs of the parents are different due to 
their situation and their business activity. Despite the Korean Chaebol had international 
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experiences,  its  petrochemical  branch  has  always  stayed  into the  local  market.  In 
contrast, in 2003, the French company had branches in more than 100 countries around 
the  world.  However,  it  was  the  first  time for  the  French  company  to  undertake  an 
investment in Korea. Some trades were done before with other  Korean companies but 
no internationalization has been done before this one. It seems that the situation of the 
French company has done much more international experiences compare to the Korean 
company. Nonetheless, according to the interviewee, it has not affected the joint venture 
formation and development. Moreover, while both parents operate in the same line of 
business – petrochemical products, the core business of the two companies is different 
to each other. In fact, oil and petrochemical products is the main business activity of the 
French company while for the Korean Chaebol, the petrochemical products is just one 
of their branches, electronic consumer product is the main activity of the group. As the 
result, their respective business and management strategy (BMS) are different than the 
BMS of the venture. Thus, in order to achieve their common goal, the Case A’s strategy 
depends of a specific board made up of 6 managers: 3 from each parent, chosen by the 
venture and belonging either to the parent companies or to the joint venture. In this way, 
the JV adopts a unique strategy for the venture.
In the JV formation, the equity stakes  have been imported according to the respective 
resources of each parent. The Korean company brought all the facilities for the venture 
including  human  resources  and  production  plants.  In  contrast, the  French  company 
brought some financial supports, production methods,  safety and security, and internal 
control. According to the interviewee, the production plants were new and much more 
advanced and thriftier than the one that French company  use in France. The Korean 
parent of the venture was as well more developed in term of technologies and processes 
than  the  French  company.  Thus,  the  intangible  resources  of  the  French company 
complete some lacks of their partner.  On the other hand, internal control did not exist 
within the Korean company and brought transparency in the internal finance.
Finally, the Case A is planning on reaching about 1900 people with still the 4 positions 
hold by the French company, and a turnover of 12 trillion KRW by 2016. In 2003, the 
Case A employed 700 people including the 4 French expatriates, and in 2010, the Case 
A had 1 100 employees and the turnover was about 7,4 trillion KRW).
5.1.3. Management control
The Case A does not really exercise control within the venture and it may be justified by 
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three  main  reasons:  the  independence  of  the  venture,  its  “auto-control”  and  the 
relationship within the venture as it will be developed next. 
When the venture was established, the joint venture agreed on running independently of 
its parents. In fact, for both companies the profitability of the venture is one of the main 
objectives. As a result, the venture manages itself following the strategy established by 
the board of directors  as explained in the previous part.  However, the venture has the 
ability of taking any decision regarding the venture until the limit of the investment of 2 
billion KRW. The system of the venture is based on the DOA (Delegation Of Authority) 
meaning that every manager has responsibilities at each level. This approach of control 
simplifies and increases the speed of the decision process, but over a certain limits the 
venture has to consult its parents. 
During the interview, the manager of the case A claimed that the management control of 
the venture is based on an “auto-control” system. In reality, due to the 50/50 ownership 
of the venture, both parents have the same level of responsibility and interest to achieve 
high performance.  As a result,  the two partners take care indirectly that the objectives 
are achieved. Nonetheless, the two partners do not try to check what their partner is 
doing  for  the  reason  of  the  high  level  of  trust  in  the  relationship  as  it  will  be 
demonstrated next. 
The last reasons of the absence of management control is explained by the relationship 
and trust involved into the Case A. Within the venture, only 4 positions are filled by a 
manager from the French company (not always French native speaker). The rest of the 
employee is Korean, but they are chosen and under the responsibility of the JV – except 
for 4 Korean managers for the same reason of the French company. The  function of 
these  4 managers  regards  high position such as vice  president  or CFO. Further  the 
language used in the JV is Korean – including  the  ERP system  (Enterprise Resource 
Planning). Nevertheless, despite the small number of French employees and the use of 
the Korean language, the company is really trustful.  Alternatively, the reasons of this 
high level of trust are also a culture matter. The Korean culture seems to encourage such 
relationship because  of  their  sincere  concern  at  work.  It  will  be  briefly  further 
developed in the performance part.
In addition to these three reasons, the Case A’s financial activities are controlled daily 
by their parents. In fact, because both parents are registered on the stock exchange, they 
are required to report  on a daily basis their activity  as  well  as  planning  and quarterly 
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reports.
Finally, the venture A exercise internal control. Internal control is defined as a process to 
help to achieve goal, and prevent and detecting fraud (Sampson 1999).  Thanks to this 
method, the Case A makes sure to be efficient and to avoid any corruption in the venture 
which may have happened in the Korean company before.
5.1.4. Performance
The Case  A measures the  success  of  the  venture based  on the  two more important 
criteria: the return on investment of the venture and at the same time the growth rate. 
These two indicators affirm the continuity of the venture  as they represent the main 
interests of the venture. 
On top of the assessment of these two factors, the Case A has to measure and present the 
financial activities of the venture due to the presence of the parent companies in the 
stock market as explained in the previous part.
Furthermore,  for the Case A, and for all the cases studied  in the present research, the 
knowledge  transfer  is  not  a  criteria  to  take  into  account  in  the  assessment  of 
performance. In fact, the Korean culture brings a very different managing style and the 
way of working which result in a high level of efficiency. However, this attitude cannot 
be transferred in France because of this culture matter. Moreover, the language is also a 
barrier  of knowledge transfer and a protection for the Korean.  The use of the local 
language in the venture affects positively its productivity. At last, the Korean company 
does not need to acquire knowledge as the abilities of their partner are similar.  As the 
result,  knowledge  transfer  does  not  take  place  in  the  studied  venture  and  is  not 
considered on the evaluation of performance.
Finally, the Case A is globally very satisfied of the performance of the joint venture and 
the venture itself.  The measures show important profits and an increasing growth rate 
which attests that the objectives of the venture have been reached. Further the venture A 
forecast  to  double  its  turnover  in the  next  5  years.  Nevertheless,  the  manager 
commented that the performance achieved is not related to the management control of 
the company. In fact, he assumed that the performance of a joint venture is the result of 
the right partner selection. A joint venture leads to success if the partners share the same 
company culture and the motivations on achieving their common goal. 
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Regarding the tension with North-Korea, there is no statement showing that the venture 
will  stop running if  a  conflict  arises.  However,  as  their  production  plants  can  be  a 
potential target or victim of any accident, an evacuation plan is established in order to 
evacuate everyone on safe zone by the next twelve hours. 
5.1.5. Conclusion
To conclude, the relationship between management control and performance within the 
Case A cannot be established.  The management control  that operates the Case A does 
not explicitly exist. The venture applies 50/50 ownership and runs independently of its 
parents.  Consequently, the  Case  A  “auto-controls”  itself  but until  a  certain  limit  – 
project over 2billion KRW. This ownership style gives a sense of responsibility of both 
partners which lead them to perform well. Finally, the relationship and trust within the 
venture discharge the partner to exercise control.
The performances of the Case A are globally very satisfying. Built on the profitability of 
the venture and its growth rate, the venture achieved its objectives and the forecast for 
the next years  appears positive. However,  the success of the venture justified  is  not 
linked to the management control. The company culture and the motivation of both 
partner of achieving financial outcomes through this venture lead the Case A to perform 
well.
5.2. Case B
5.2.1. Presentation of the interviewee
The interview (through phone call) has been done with a French project manager.  He 
has worked for more than 2 years within the venture for a 3-year project, but have been 
working for the French company for more than 10 years. This manager is one of the 35 
expatriates from France and one of the 45 French speaking persons out of the 5600 
people working in the Case B. Due to the short experience within the JV and the lack of 
time of the manager, the amount of collected information is limited.
5.2.2. Background of the company
The Case B started in 2000 while the Korean car manufacturer was  hit by the 1998 
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Korean  economic  crisis.  The  Korean  company  was  looking  for  a  purchaser  with  a 
preference  for  a  European  company.  The  French  and  Korean  companies  agreed  on 
working  together  and  the  French  partner  bought  70% of  the  capital of  the  Korean 
company, the rest were divided between the bank (10%) and the Korean partner (20%). 
Later, the  French company bought  the  10%  stake  from the  bank  and 1% from the 
Korean company. Nowadays, the French company is considering to buying back 9% 
more of the ownership from the Korean company.
The purpose of the Case B is to develop, produce and sell cars mainly for the Korean 
market.  Nonetheless, the personal interest of each partner altered. In fact, the BMS of 
the French company is to  take over the Korean company and settle down in South-
Korea in order to have a manufacturing platform in Asia, while the Korean company is 
trying to save their investment.  In this way, the ownership  is shared but the  Korean 
company do not have any effect on the management of the venture. In fact, despite that 
the venture is owned by  the Korean company up to 19%, every strategic decision  is 
made from the board composed of 6 managers from the French company.  In the long 
run, the Case B is planning on becoming a subsidiary of the French company in order to 
supply their Asian sale network and penetrate the Chinese market. 
The reasons why the two companies undertook a JV instead of an acquisition from the 
French partner is justified by the need of the Korean company to penetrate the Korean 
market.  It is challenging to  access the Korean market because consumers tend to buy 
local brand. Therefore, the Korean company allows the French car manufacturer to use 
their brand image under a 10-year basis renewable contract. 
5.2.3. Management control
The  Case  B  has  a  particularity  compare  to  the  other  joint  ventures  studied  in  this 
research. In fact, despite that this case is theoretically a joint venture as its ownership is 
divided between the two companies  as 81% for the French parent and 19% for the 
Korean parent, the French company consider the Case B as a subsidiary in Korea.  As 
explained in the strategy, the Korean parent receives only the dividend and capital of the 
venture up to  their  ownership  and it  is  not  involved on the strategy.  Regarding the 
management and the strategy of the joint venture itself, the French company has the full 
responsibility. As a result, the board of director is composed only of French managers as 
well as the most important position such as the CEO, CFO, R&D and Design directors 
are positioned by a French speaking person.
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Among the 5500 employees of the venture, only 10% are able to speak French. Thus, 
the French adopted the strategy to work by pair  with a French and a Korean speaking 
person  for  every  division  of  the  venture.  This  working  method  enhances  the 
communication and the atmosphere between the operational and managerial part of the 
venture. 
Finally, the fact the Case B depends of the agreement about the use of the brand image 
of the Korean company may be perceived as a control by the later. For the venture, the 
role of the brand image  of the Korean company seems to secure their position  in the 
local market.
5.2.4. Performance
The  Case  B  measures  performance  through  five indicators:  market  share,  sales 
(domestic and export),  operational  margin,  profit  margin  and  cash flow.  The factors 
assessed  are  chosen by the  French  company  and  specific  its strategy.  As  it  was 
explained previously, the management of the venture is exclusively done by the French 
partner.  As a result,  the performance of the venture are measured according to their 
needs.
The performances recorded  in 2011 of the Case B show that the company is facing a 
hard time.  In fact, the Case B’s market share has significantly decreased from 11% to 
8,5% in 2011.  According to the interviewee, the reasons why the  performances of the 
Case B  are low do not result of the management of the venture but from its external 
environment.  In fact,  South-Korea car market is divided in 4 categories: (1) Korean 
brand 1, (2) Korean brand 2,  (3) the Case B and (4) the foreign brands. The market 
share of the Korean brand 1 and 2 represent about 70% while the Case B is about 11% 
and the rest for the foreign brands. In addition, the Korean brand 1 and 2 becomes more 
and more important on the international market.  As a result, Case B’s competitors are 
rich,  more aggressive and popular than  ever.  Nonetheless, the Case B project soon to 
penetrate the Chinese market which is growing rapidly since the 90 and is estimated to 
grow tenfold between 2005 and 2030. 
5.2.5. Conclusion
To conclude, the Case B is particular compare to others because the management style 
is  closer  than a  subsidiary than a  JV.  The approach of control and performance are 
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French company oriented. To sum up, the venture B do not need to exercise control as 
the French company  does it entirely  for  the alliance. The management control of the 
French company is limited to the insurance of a good communication between a French 
and  a  Korean  person.  Further  the  use  of  the  brand  image  of  the  Korean  company 
appears to be a part of control from the Korean company.
The  performance  of  the  Case  B  is  assessed through  the indicators  “market  share”, 
“sales” (domestic and export), “operational margin”, “profit margin” and “cash flow”. 
These factors are chosen by the French company according to its strategy. Last year, the 
recorded figures were not satisfying for the venture as they were decreasing (1% of 
market share less than the previous year). However, the performance of the venture is 
not the results of the management style or control of the venture. The reasons of this 
low performance have been explained by the external environment of the venture. The 
local  car  manufacturers  are  becoming  more  competitive  in  the  local  as  well  as 
international market.
5.3. Case C 
5.3.1. Presentation of the interviewee
The interview has been conducted with the CEO of the joint venture  C. The current 
CEO of the venture has participated to the establishment of the  Case  C since 2007. 
About 1 year and a half later in 2008 when the venture started, he took the position of 
Chief. The interviewee is one of the two expatriates from the French Company and the 
only French speaking person within the venture.
5.3.2. Background of the company
The Case C was established in 2008 for an unlimited duration. Before 2008, the French 
company was already running a  joint  venture  with  another  Korean company in  the 
lubricant industry  (ownership 49/51 French dominant – 8% of the domestic market). 
Because of a lack of interest of the Korean company and the opportunity of forming 
another venture with a more interesting partner, the French company ended their joint 
venture to set up a new one with a more important lubricant Korean company. In fact, 
the current Korean partner of the Case C was looking for a partner in order to be more 
competitive and move from 7% to 15% of the domestic market share. In this way, the 
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Korean  company  could  compete  with  the  two  other  Korean  leaders  of  the  market 
occupying each 15% of the domestic market. The real interest for the French company 
to enter in joint venture with this company was the straight access of the raw material as 
the Korean company is also a refiner, and has a better logistic and sales network.
The  partners of the  joint venture C  share the same business activity but at a different 
level  – the size of the French company is about 5 times bigger than the Korean one. 
Regarding the objectives of the venture, the Case C’s partners have several expectations. 
They wish through this venture to double the size of their previous activity. In fact, they 
would  like  to  move  from  an  individual  share  of  8%  the  market  to  15% together. 
Moreover, they expect to obtain through the alliance the synergy of both companies. 
From  a  local  perspective,  the  French  partner  wishes to  take  benefits  of  the  local 
distribution network of their partner due to the important automobile industry in Korea 
which  needs  lubricant.  On  the  other  hand, the  Korean  company  may  use  the 
international position and the fame of the French company to develop its reputation and 
network around the world.
Despite the similarities on the expectations of both partners, the strategy of the venture 
is  established  separately.  In  fact,  a  board  of  director  composed  of  6  members:  3 
managers from each partner, sets up the business and management strategy. In this way, 
the decisions made are neutral and do not give advantages to a party. In addition, it 
chooses only the best strategy for the venture.
For the joint venture, both partners brought tangible and intangible resources as both 
companies had previous activities in the lubricant area  in South-Korea.  Indeed, each 
company brings a factory including their HR. The Case C’s partners share as well their 
patents and licenses. Nevertheless, if the JV is led up to the end, the companies will get 
their intellectual properties back.
5.3.3. Management control
The Case C shows some similarities with the Case A regarding its management control. 
In fact, the management control does not exist explicitly within the venture. The JV C 
has an equal 50/50 ownership control and assumes an auto-control of the venture for the 
same reasons as they were explained for the Case A “5.1.3. Management control”. The 
Case C is also running independently of its parents.  The two  partners of the venture 
have merged their  lubricant  activities together.  Thus,  it  is  better  for them  to  run 
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independently this activity in order to be more efficient.
Finally,  as for  the Case A, the parent  companies of  the JV are quoted in the stock 
market.  Despite that the shareholders do not have a direct impact on the joint venture 
management and control, the joint venture has to be profitable. As a result, the financial 
activity of the venture is controlled on a daily basis.
5.3.4. Performance
The  Case  C  measures  performance  through  three  main  indicators:  (1)  return  on 
investment,  (2)  market  share,  and  (3)  goals achievement.  The  factor  “return  on 
investment”  appears  the  most important  for  the  company.  In fact,  if  the  JV is  not 
profitable, the  two companies may not continue on working together.  The  two other 
indicators are less important. Despite the acquisition of 15% of the market share is one 
of the main purpose of the venture, Case C is more flexible on the result of the market 
share indicator.  As it has been seen with the Case B, the external environment may 
challenge the expectation of the venture.  Consequently, the results of the market share 
cannot affect the venture and its management. Completely, the last indicator is about the 
goals achievement  of the venture.  Every year,  the board of directors establishes the 
objectives of the years regarding the action plan, security and safety and HR, in a limit 
of a certain budget. This indicator checks whether this goals are achieved.
After running the JV for about 3 years so far, the case company C is globally satisfied 
with the joint venture. However, one of their main objectives has not been reached. The 
JV shows profitability, but the targeted market share could not be reached yet. In fact, 
because  the  venture  started  recently,  the  objectives  were  more  concentrated  on  the 
financial outputs than the gain of market share. Thus, the Case C expects to attain their 
goal later.
Following the interview with the CEO of the Case C, the success of the JV is  not the 
result  of  the management  control  as  it  does  not  explicitly exist  within  the JV.  The 
performances of the venture  are explained by two reasons. First of all, the companies 
involved in the venture must have a similar company culture.  In the partner selection, 
the  companies  have  to  consider  their  match  according to  their  culture  despite  their 
amount of previous international experiences or their size. Then, the companies should 
take the necessary time to establish the venture.  During the negotiation time of the 
agreement of the venture, the companies involved must consent in every details of the 
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venture. As a result, according to the Case C, the achievement of IJV performance is the 
result of the right partner selection and the appropriate foundation of the venture.
Finally, the  conflict  between South  and North  Korea  has  no effects  on  the  venture 
regarding the performance or the relationship.
5.3.5. Conclusion
To conclude, the Case C is similar to the Case A regarding its management control. The 
joint  venture  runs independently  of  its  parents  and  has  adopted  an  auto-control  to 
conduct the venture to success.  The joint venture C is also tamed by its parents on its 
financial activities due to the registration of both parents in the stock market. Therefore, 
the Case C does not give importance on the management control of the venture.
The  Case  C  is  successful in  spite  of not  every objectives  have  been  reached.  The 
performances of the venture are assessed through the return on investment, the market 
share and the goals achievement factors.  While the JV is  profitable,  its objective of 
reaching 15% of the market share has not been achieved yet. The reason related to this 
failure is due to a more important focus on the profitability of the venture. As regards 
the success of the venture, it is the result a of matching of two company cultures and the 
well  establishment of the venture itself.  One more time, a relationship could not be 
found between management control and performance.
5.4. Case D
5.4.1. Presentation of the interviewee
The interview has been conducted with the CEO of the Case D who has been the first 
and only CEO running the venture since its start  in 2008.  The CEO does not have a 
contract limitation on his post. The CEO of the Case D is one of the three expatriates 
from the French company.
5.4.2. Background of the company
The Case D  has been established in 2008 for a 30-year project in order to build and 
manage the subway line 9  of Seoul city.  In fact, the  history of the  Case D  started in 
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2002 with  the negotiations  about  the  agreement between  the  partners.  In  2005,  the 
building  of  the  subway line  began  and  in  July  2009 the  subway  line  opened. The 
building of a  subway line is  usually  managed by the local  authorities,  however the 
government wanted to experience the project run by a private company to contrast the 
results. In this way, a private company may be more competitive and productive due to 
its structure, which may have an impact on the total cost of the project. Consequently, a 
Korean company has been selected to be in charge of conducting the project.  Because 
this company was able only to build the line and not to operate it – as it is usually done 
by the local authorities, it looked for a partner. The criteria of the partner expected was 
to  have an extensive experienced company in the field  of subway line management 
which has a  strong fame. Three companies answered to  the call for tenders and the 
French  company  has  finally  been  selected  due  to  its expertise in  the  subway  line 
operation, its size and its international presence – 80 000 employees with a 5,8 billion 
EUR turnover and present in 27 countries around the world).
The purpose of gathering these two companies is to complete the skills of each other in 
order to carry through the project. Despite their work for the same project, the role of 
each  company  is  specific  according  to  their  savoir-faire.  The Korean  company  is 
specialized  in  the  rolling  stone  construction  while the  French  company  is on  its 
management.  Hence,  each  partner  manages  and  controls  their  respective  activities. 
However, the ownership of the venture is dominant by the French company with 80% of 
the  equity.  As  the  operation of  the subway line  is  managed  by the  French  partner 
although the  Korean company manages only the building and the maintenance of the 
latter, it is easier for the venture to  be governed by the French company. Further it is 
important to note that the Korean company is also a supplier and client of the venture.  
In  this  manner, the  transparency  of  the  activity  of  the  venture may  have  been 
reconsidered. As a result, the board of director in charge of the strategy of the venture is 
composed of 5 managers from the French parent and 2 managers from the other partner. 
It will be more developed on the next part “5.4.3. Management control”.
Because  the  core  business  and  responsibilities of  each  partner  differs,  the  two 
companies have a personal interest on the  JV. In fact, the French company plans on 
settling down in South Korea as a  subway line operator company. On the other hand, 
the Korean company wishes to reinforce its activity on the  rolling stone construction. 
Nonetheless, the BMS adopted for the venture is chosen to be the most appropriate to 
the venture.
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In the agreement of the venture, it is said that  during 30 years the line is the property 
and the responsibility of the Case D. Then the government will take over the line and 
the project will be over. During this 30 years, the responsibility of the venture and in 
particular the role of the French company as it operates the subway line, is to make sure 
that the shops at the station are profitable and the choice of subcontracting companies 
(such as for cleaning) are right. As regards the responsibility of the Korean company, it 
has to maintain the maintenance of the train and ascertain its safety.
As the project is an order from the government, the investment does not require any 
contribution  from the  companies  of  the  Case  D.  The only  assets that  the  company 
partners  brought  are building  the  subway  line  and intangible  knowledge  for  the 
management of the line.
5.4.3. Management control
The management control of the Case D is based on a split control (see Choi & Beamish 
2004  in  the  part  “2.5.  Control  structure,  autonomy  and  independence”).  The  JV’s 
partners have a cross liability according to their role. The Korean company is running 
and controlling the building of the subway line while the French company manages and 
controls the operation of it. However, the French company dominates the global strategy 
of the venture up to 80% of the ownership.
Recently, the ownership division of the venture has changed due to some reorganization 
in the management of the French  company.  In fact, the Asian division of the French 
company (French company 1) have moved to a 50:50 joint venture with another French 
company  (French company 2) except for 8% of the current venture.  As a result, the 
current ownership of the Case D is as follow: Korean company (20%), French company 
1  (44%) and French company 2  (36%). This change in  the ownership  may involve 
problems in the management of the venture. The way the control is managed will not be 
affected, however, the distribution of the dividends may be confused.
Despite  the  presence  of  three  parents  for  the  alliance,  the  venture  is  running 
independently. Indeed, the Case D does not have to be answerable to its parents due to 
the profit that the JV made, the Case D is self financing.
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5.4.4. Performance
The Case D measures just a few criteria in order to determine its performance. As the 
venture did not invest money and belongs to the service industry, the JV focuses only on 
two indicators: the profitability and the quality of the service. Like every company, the 
Case D follows the financial activity, however its results will not affect the venture. In 
fact, the French company is under a contract which engages their responsibility on the 
financial success of the venture up to a certain limit. If the outcome is higher, the French 
company gets profit, if not, the French company has to compensate. Since the beginning 
of the venture, the French company recorded profit slightly higher than expected.
Furthermore,  the  second criterion of  performance  is  the  quality  of  the  service.  For 
Korean people,  the concept of service is  very important  and affects  their  choice  on 
everyday life. For the Case D, the quality of the service within the subway line means 
the cleanness of the wagons and the station, the availability, the presentation and the 
look of  the  staff,  and the  frequency rate  of  the  train. The quality  of  the  service  is 
measured by the  customer  satisfaction through surveys and feedbacks,  and through 
other indicators regarding  the attendance rate of the line  and the shops located in the 
station. Among the subway lines of Seoul city, the line managed by the Case D is most 
agreeable  to  travel  with.  One more time,  the results  recorded show a  high level  of 
satisfaction  for  both  the  passenger  and  the  venture. While  the  Case  D  has  been 
established  just  a  few  years  ago,  the  financial  outcomes  are  higher  than  the  one 
forecasted.
Case  D  is  so  far  successful  on  their  objectives  and globally  satisfied with  the  JV. 
However, according to the interviewee, the achievement of the objectives of the venture 
is not the result or linked with the management control style. If the Case D is successful, 
it  is the result of the 5 years of negotiation  upstream  of the joint venture formation. 
During this time, every part and specificity of the venture have been discussed into the 
agreement.  One more the facts speak plainly, the management control  does not affect 
the performance of the venture in the Case D. However, the management control style 
seems appropriate to the joint venture D.
Nevertheless, the  French  company feels disappointed  with the relationship with their 
partner. In fact, because there are operating and managing different parts of the project, 
the Korean company seems not  to  show interest on sharing information  and building 
relationship with their partner. In spite of that, the Korean company has been qualified 
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as an “easy” partner. The Korean company is a serious and efficient partner which does 
not cause problems.
Finally, as the other cases, the conflict between South and North Korea has no effects on 
the venture regarding the performance or the relationship.
5.4.5. Conclusion
As a conclusion, the Case D achieved higher satisfaction than expected while the JV has 
just  started a few years ago. The Case D  manages  the  control through a split control 
style.  In this manner, the responsibilities are shared between the partners according to 
their role into the venture. This control management style has been seen as a favorable 
decision for the venture but harmful for the relationship between the partners. However, 
the performances itself of the venture are not affected by the management control of the 
venture.
The Case D assesses the success of the venture based on the profitability of the venture 
and  the  quality  of  the  service.  The  outcomes  achieved  show  that  the  Case  D  is 
successful.  Despite the split control was an appropriate choice for the management of 
the venture, it  has not been considered as a  justification of the achievement of such 
results. The reasons of the positive results of the venture are explained by the upstream 
negotiations  (5 years)  which have led the venture to be organized  this way.  From the 
experience of the Case D, it can be concluded that management control does not affect 
the performance of the joint venture.
5.5. Summary of the empirical results
As a summary of the part five, the empirical results found in this research are presented on the following table. The conclusion of the study 
will be done on the next section “6.2. Conclusions”.
Case A Case B Case C Case D
Intended duration None None None 30 Years
BMS Similar only to FC Similar only to FC Best for the venture Totally different
Previous experience FC Yes but first time in Korea Yes but first time in Asia Yes and did a JV in Korea Yes but first time in Asia 
Previous experience KC No but the Chaebol yes No but the Chaebol yes No No but the Chaebol yes
Equity stake FC Cash, some methods Cash, skills and 
knowledge
A factory Subway line  management 
skill
Equity stake KC HR, substructure HR, substructure A factory Skills and knowledge
Board of Directors 3 French 3 Korean Only French managers 3 French 3 Korean 5 French 2 Korean
Type of control 50/50 French dominant 81/19 50/50 Split  control  but  French 
dominant 80/20
Actor of control Both parents and 
indirectly shareholders 
Only the French company Both parents and 
indirectly shareholders 
Both parents
Continuation of the table on the next page.
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Case A Case B Case C Case D
JV independent of its 
parents
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Management control Auto-control
Internal control
Daily financial reporting
Working by pair
Exclusively from the 
French partner
Auto-control
Daily financial reporting
Split control
Performance criteria 
measured
Return on investment
Growth rate
Market Share
Sales
Operational margin
Cash flow
Return on investment
Market share
Goal achievement
Profitability
Quality of the service
Global satisfaction Yes Yes but not this year Yes  but  market  share 
objective  has  not  been 
reached yet
Yes 
Reasons of low or high 
performance
Same company culture
Goal congruity
Well  establishment  of the 
venture
Stronger competitors (-)
Working by pair (+)
Same company culture
Well  establishment  of the 
venture
Well  establishment  of  the 
venture
Relationship between 
control and performance
None None None None
Table 14. Cross-case comparison of the empirical results of the 4 case companies studied
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6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The section 6 is the last part of this thesis and aims to conclude the thesis. It starts by 
summing up the different parts of the present study followed by the presentation of the 
conclusions of the research. This chapter also suggests some propositions for further 
research based on the empirical results of this study.
6.1. Summary of the thesis
The purpose of  this  research  was to  examine the  relationship  between management 
control and performance in the environment of French-Korean joint ventures located in 
South-Korea. Through this study, the research question about the effects of management 
control  on  the  performance  of  the  venture  tried  to  be  answer.  The  research  was 
organized  in  4  main  parts:  (1)  the  introduction,  (2)  the  literature  review,  (3)  the 
empirical research, and (4) the conclusion. Each part will be summarized next.
The introduction part presented the background of the research and the starting point of 
the study. In this section, the needs of undertaking a research about management control 
and  performance in IJVs  in South-Korea  have  been  developed  and  the  research 
questions responding  to  these  needs  presented.  Then,  a short  presentation  of  the 
previous  literature  has been  made  for  the  purpose  of  presenting  the  existing  works 
relative  to  this  topic.  These  works  have  been  further  developed  in  the  “Literature 
review” section and used throughout the writing of this paper. Finally, the structure of 
the present thesis has been introduced.
The literature review aimed to introduce the previous theoretical and empirical research. 
This section was divided into 2 chapters in order to present on one side the literatures 
regarding  management  control,  and  on  the  other  side,  the  literatures about  IJV 
performance. The main theories, concepts and approaches about these two elements of 
IJVs were presented for the purpose of acquiring extensive knowledge about the thesis 
topic.  To  conclude  the  literature  review,  a  framework  has  been  made  in  order  to 
emphasize the main factors to study in this research.
The empirical part presented the research method and the empirical results of the study 
through two different chapters. The first one introduced the research methodology of the 
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study, and the reasons why the study has been conducted this way. It presented as well 
the information regarding the questionnaire and the interviews and finally it introduces 
the 4 case companies used in the present research. In the second chapter of the empirical 
part,  the  results  from  the  4  interviews  have  been  presented.  In  the  results,  the 
background of each case has been introduced in order to understand the reasons of the 
management style of the JV. 
Finally, the last section “6. Conclusion” ends this thesis. First it summarizes the thesis 
and then presents the conclusions of the empirical research and the further research as it 
will be shown next.
6.2. Conclusions
Before presenting the conclusions of the research, the empirical purpose of  this thesis 
will  be reminded. This study sheds some light on the complex relationship between 
management control and IJV performance based on an exhaustive analysis of French-
Korean  JVs  located  in  South-Korea. As  a  first  step, the  management  control  and 
assessment  of  performance  have  been  identified  within  those  JVs,  followed  by  the 
relationship between these two factors. It is through the experience of 4 case companies 
that the outcomes of the research will be drawn.
In this  research,  in  contrast  with the theoretical  approach of  the topic,  management 
control appears to be less significant. In fact, in the 4 cases studied, control has not been 
considered in the establishment of the JV and limited to its ownership. For instance, in 
the 2 cases having a 50/50 ownership, they claimed to have adopted indirectly an auto-
control of the venture in order to answer my question. Regarding the two other cases, 
the answers  have  not be found.  Through the outcomes of the study, some conclusions 
have been found about the reasons why management control is dismissed as it will be 
shown below.
First of all, every joint venture studied was financially independent and did not have to 
be  answerable  in any ways  to their parents. In this manner,  the JV is free on  taking 
decisions and choosing the management style the most appropriate  to the venture.  In 
addition, the parents of the venture were willing to share their technological licenses in 
order for the venture to perform the best. Nevertheless, they do not expect anything in 
exchange except a profitable situation. Thus, the amount of control needed is lower as 
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the venture itself takes the full responsibilities. 
The  second main  reason  which  has  led  the  JV to  avoid  control  into  their  venture, 
concerns the perception of  trust. In fact,  Korean companies  may interpret  control as a 
lack  of  trust  in  the  venture  or  with  themselves. As  cited  in  the  part  “5.  Empirical 
results”, the absence of control reinforce the trust between the partners. It should not be 
concluded that management control affect negatively the performance of the venture, 
but some further studies would be needed to show evidence.  As a result, management 
control is perceived as a negative factor for the alliance. 
Finally, the JVs studied have judged that management control was not necessary to the 
venture because of the clear agreement made before the JV started. Indeed, according to 
the interview of the 4 JVs, they assume that the success of their venture was the results 
of a transparent  negotiation. For both partners, the fact that the bases of the venture 
frame every details of the alliance especially regarding its objectives, it is not necessary 
to  establish control.  Thus,  the agreement of the JV will define the need of control.  At 
last, control plays as well the role of evaluating the performance of the venture as it will 
be developed next. 
The performances of the cases are controlled essentially through the observations of 
indicators. The most important need of the JV is to be profitable in order to assume their 
independence which is as well the basis to achieve the other goals of the venture. As the 
result, the indicator regarding the financial output measure is systematically taken into 
account  in  the  analysis  of  the  performance.  Then,  other  indicators  are  considered 
according  to  the  situation  and  the  objectives  of  the  venture.  However,  it  has  been 
observed that there is no extra measure than the ones for the objectives. The fact that the 
ventures are independent justifies the  JV partners do not need to assess other criteria. 
Despite the literature review about IJV performance highlights knowledge transfer as an 
important factor to regard on the achievement of performance, none o the case studies 
was interested on transferring skill and knowledge as it will be shown next.
In  the  empirical  part,  the  companies  involved in  the  study did  not tried  to  transfer 
knowledge from France to Korea or from Korea to France despite their R&D activity. 
The principal argument relates to the absence of information to transmit. In fact, on one 
hand, the partners did not have  knowledge  to exchange  because either both partners 
have a similar amount of intangible equity, either the partners operates in a different 
field.  On  the  other  hand,  the  language  and  the  culture  obstruct  the  transfer  of 
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knowledge. For  every  case,  the  language  used  in  the  venture were Korean.  It  is 
important to note that  just a few French managers were working into the venture.  In 
addition, an important amount of Korean manager did not have good English skills to 
conduct the venture in English.  As a result,  the ERP system as well  as most of the 
meeting is conducted in Korean. It is better for the venture to adopt the local language 
in order to be more efficient, but the communication of the information to the foreign 
partner  becomes  more  difficult.  Moreover,  the  Korean  culture  obstructs  knowledge 
transfer in a sense that the culture itself brings a certain rhythm in the company that 
cannot be applied into a French company. For example, in Korean company, when a 
decision  is  made,  the  employer  will  do  their  best  into  realize  the  task  before  the 
deadline, cheaper than planned and more efficient. Consequently, knowledge transfer is 
not applicable to the situation of the case study.
According  to  the  information  collected  during  the  interviews,  the  achievement  of 
success is not the result in any case of the management control style of the venture. 
Indeed, the managers met  – except  for  the Case B -  claimed that, the most  relevant 
factors to succeed such alliances are the partner selection and a clear agreement about 
the venture conditions. As for the Case B, the venture doomed on the long term to be a 
subsidiary of the French company, therefore the strategy and management adopted for 
this case do not match with a usual venture. Through the results of the other cases, these 
two factors were taken as the origin of the success of their venture. The selection of the 
right partner of the venture is not based on the goal congruity of the companies, but 
based on the similitude of the company culture.  In fact, two companies may have the 
same goals but cannot achieve it due to their difference of perspective and management. 
The other  factor responsible of the success of the ventures studied is  related to the 
agreement  of  the  venture.  Between  the  partner  selection  and  the  beginning  of  the 
venture,  the  partners  involved  in  the  JV  discussed  about  the  conditions  of  the 
management of the latter thought an agreement. If the agreement covers every specific 
aspect of the goal of the venture, the manner of how to reach it as well as the conditions 
including unexpected situations, then the venture may run efficiently.  As the present 
thesis  focuses  on  the  relationship  between  control  and  performance,  some  further 
research  related  only  to  IJV performance  are  needed  to  confirm the  results  of  this 
research.
Finally, to answer the research question regarding the relationship between management 
control and performance in French-Korean JVs, there is no evidence that management 
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control  affects  positively  or  negatively the  performance  in  the  4  cases selected. 
However, the  management  control adopted in each case seemed to be appropriate to 
their respective situation. Due to the fact that these 4 JVs were all independent of their 
parents,  control  was nearly inexistent.  In contrast,  if  management  control  may have 
been more emphasized within the venture, the performance may have be different. This 
last point leads directly to the next chapter where further research will be suggested in 
order to approve the found conclusions. 
To conclude the conclusion part,  the table  15 summarizes the main outcomes of the 
thesis.
General conclusions of the thesis
-  Management  control  is  not  considered  during  the  JV  formation due  to  several 
reasons:
    - Independence of the venture
    - Control understood as a lack of trust within the venture
    - Due to a clear agreement, control does not to be established
- Management control may affect negatively the JV
- Performance of the venture are based on quantitative data such as financial outputs 
and market share
- The partner of the venture do not measure knowledge transfer due to the culture, the 
language and the absent of need
- Partner selection (same company culture) and a clear agreement about the venture are 
the main factors of the success of the ventures analyzed
- No evidence has been found between management control an IJV performance
Table 15. General conclusions of the thesis
6.3. Suggestions for further research
In order to end this research, some future research will be presented according to  the 
results  of the present  study.  Three further  research  will be briefly suggested  for the 
purpose of clarifying some unexpected phenomena.
This research was based on the study of French-Korean JVs located in South-Korea, but 
only  4  cases  have  been  analyzed. In  fact,  the  absence  of  correlation  between 
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management  control  and  performance  resulting  from this  research,  needs  a  broader 
investigation.  In order to make a generalization of the result, it would be necessary to 
extend the research to other JVs including western countries – especially from Europe. 
Moreover, the JV selected must run independently of their parents in order to reproduce 
the same environment.
The second suggestion concerns the effect of control over performance in IJV in Korea. 
In this thesis, the 4 cases selected were all independent of their parents. Thus, a study 
should be undertaken on IJV located  in Korea having a control from its parents.  As a 
result, the supposition about a negative effect of control may be validated.
Finally, some conclusions regarding the IJV performance factors have been presented. 
As  the  thesis  focus  mainly  on  the  relationship  between  management  control  and 
performance, an in-depth research focusing mainly on the achievement of performance 
should be conducted to confirm the positive effect of the right partner selection and a 
clear agreement on IJV performance. 
The table 16 summarizes the future research suggested following the conclusion of the 
study.
Summary of the further research
- Extend the research to other JV involving western countries (especially from Europe) 
in order to find more evidences on the absence of correlation  between management 
control and performance in JV running independently of its parents.
- Undertaking a boarder research on IJV in Korea having a control from its parents to 
observe the effect of control on performance
-  Going  into  in  depth  the  fact  that  performance  is  the  result  of  the  right  partner 
selection and a clear agreement into IJVs independent of their parents
Table 16. Summary of the further research
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APPENDIX 1: Questionnaire
1: Presentation of the interviewee
1. Name of the interviewee: _______________________________________________
2. Position: ____________________________________________________________
3. How long have you been working:
a) for the JV in Korea:_______ b) for the company:_______
4. How long is your contract in Korea? __________ 
2. Presentation of the venture
5. Name of your company: ________________________________________________
6. Name of the international joint venture (IJV): _______________________________
7. What were the parents’ a) names, b) ownership shares (%) at the time of 
establishment, c) today (%), and d) ownership types (state-owned, Greenfield)?
Partner 1: a) ________________ b) ____ % c) ____ % d) _______________________
Partner 2: a) ________________ b) ____ % c) ____ % d) _______________________
Partner 3: a) ________________ b) ____ % c) ____ % d) _______________________
8. How was ownership divided within the venture when it was established (parent 
dominant, 50/50, split control)? How did you come to this control setting? 
9. How long was the intended duration of IJV when it was established?
a) _________ b) no duration was initially agreed
10. What is the degree of similarity between your firm and partner firm in terms of line 
of business activity?
a) very low b) low c) not at all d) high e) very high
11. Your firm’s operations in the target country before the establishment of the IJV:
a) no prior activity b) licensing agreement
c) a manufacturing IJV d) several manufacturing units 
e) other operations ___________________
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12. IJV business and management strategy (BMS) is:
a) similar to your firm’s BMS
b) similar to partner firm’s BMS
c) have chosen only the best BMS from both firms 
d) totally different from both firms’ BMS 
e) preserving both firm’s BMS
13. To which market do your products are targeted (local, French, exportation – share of 
exports)?
14. Total number of employees in your firm?
a. At the beginning:_____ b. Now:_____ c. In 5 years:_____
15. What is the number of employees from your firm in the IJV?
a. At the beginning:_____ b. Now:_____ c. In 5 years:_____
16. How many international joint venture operations does your company had before?
a) none b) one c) 2-4 d) 5-9 e) 10 or more
17. How did you identify and select your partner?
18. What are the resources that you involved into the venture (financial, HR, material ?⁾
3. Management control
19. How do you manage control within your venture (agreement, financial results, 
specific, overall, strategic operational, staffing, collective vs private control)?
20. Except the parents of the venture, who are the other actors affecting control 
(shareholder, government)? And what are their role?
21. If your JV is based on the achievement of technical product or on R&D, what are 
the effects on control (patent, copyright) and performance (once the project over, the JV 
will stop?)?
22. What role does the HR have over the venture? Over control? On the performance of 
the venture?
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23. Do you manage control in the same way that your partner does?
4. IJV performance
24. How do you measure performance? And more precisely regarding these criteria (if 
applied):
• Return on investment 1-----2-----3-----4-----5
• Market share 1-----2-----3-----4-----5
• Stability 1-----2-----3-----4-----5
• Goal achievement 1-----2-----3-----4-----5
• Knowledge transfer 1-----2-----3-----4-----5
• Other1: ___________________ 1-----2-----3-----4-----5
• Other2: ___________________ 1-----2-----3-----4-----5
25. Are you satisfied with the joint venture performance? And why?
• Return on investment 1-----2-----3-----4-----5
• Market share 1-----2-----3-----4-----5
• Stability 1-----2-----3-----4-----5
• Goal achievement 1-----2-----3-----4-----5
• Knowledge transfer 1-----2-----3-----4-----5
• Other1: ___________________ 1-----2-----3-----4-----5
• Other2: ___________________ 1-----2-----3-----4-----5
26. If you are not satisfied with the venture, what would be the reasons? If the parents of 
the venture are not satisfied, what would be the reasons?
27. How do you manage the relationship (trust, conflict and commitment) with your 
foreign partner?
28. How do you percept the Korean regulation regarding the foreign direct investment ? 
Does it have an impact on the alliance?
29. Regarding the tension between the North and South of the Korean peninsula, do you 
think it may affect the venture? What would be your reaction in case a conflict arose?
5. Conclusion
30. Could you establish a link between the manner you manage the control the venture 
and the outcomes of this latter?
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31. How would you justify the success of your venture?
32. Does the ownership control of the venture will change, if so how and why?
33. Would you like to add something that I may have forgotten?
